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RECENT CASES
ARBITRATION AND SECURITIES REGULATION -
CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT IN AN
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTION
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.1
Alberto-Culver Company, a Delaware corporation, contracted
to buy European businesses and trademarks from Fritz Scherk, a
German citizen residing in Switzerland. Alleging that the trade-
marks were encumbered contrary to Scherk's express warranties,
Alberto-Culver brought suit in federal district court in Illinois for
damages and other relief for fraudulent misrepresentations in viola-
tion of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.' Scherk's motion to stay
the action pending arbitration in Paris pursuant to prior agreements
of the parties' and in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act4
was denied. Instead, the court granted plaintiff's motion for a pre-
liminary order enjoining Scherk from proceeding with the arbitra-
tion.5 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision;' the Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-
four decision.
The specific problem in Scherk was the applicability of the
Federal Arbitration Act, allowing the enforcement of arbitration
clauses, to claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The lower courts, relying on the Supreme Court's prior decision in
Wilko v. Swan,' held the clause unenforceable against this type of
claim. The Supreme Court distinguished the precedent and held the
Arbitration Act applicable.
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, recogniz-
ing the advantages of settling disputes quickly and inexpensively,
1. - U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 2449 (1974).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
3. Arbitration agreements in contracts for the purchase of each of Sherk's three busi-
nesses provided that the parties would submit any claim or controversy arising out of the
agreements or their breach exclusively to arbitration by the International Chamber of Com-
merce, Paris, France; that each party would comply in all respects with any award; and that
the laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. would apply to and govern the agreements, their
interpretation and performance. 94 S. Ct. at 2452 n.1.
4. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
5. The district court decision is unreported.
6. 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
7. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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and thereby reversed a long-standing hostility to arbitration ex-
pressed by the federal courts.' The Act expressly covers arbitration
clauses in any maritime transaction or contract involving interstate
or foreign commerce,9 and thus applied by its terms to the clause
in Scherk. Under the Act the parties may select both the forum"0
and the rules to be applied." However, courts have held that arbi-
tration is inconsistent with the underlying policies of certain laws
and have refused to enforce such clauses against plaintiffs suing
under those laws.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes the use of "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connection with
the sale of any security illegal,"2 and rule 10b-5 makes the fraudulent
sale of any security in interstate commerce unlawful.'3 The Act con-
fers jurisdiction upon the federal courts for alleged violations'4 and
directs that any "condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person to waive compliance with any provision of this [Act] or of
any rule or regulation thereunder. . . shall be void."" In addition,
it provides that any contract made in violation of the Act shall also
be void." Because Alberto-Culver asserted that Scherk fraudulently
induced it to purchase the trademarks, and because enforcement of
the arbitration clause would have caused Alberto-Culver to waive
8. 94 S. Ct. at 2453. Regarding judicial hostility to any forum selection by the parties,
see, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); "commerce" is defined in 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) as "commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations . ... "
10. Parties may choose the arbitrators under 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
11. Arbitrators are bound by the terms of the agreement, and the decision can be set
aside for manifest infidelity to their rules. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc.,
466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970).
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
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its right to resort to federal court under the Act, the district court
and the court of appeals agreed that the arbitration stipulation was
void and that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the dispute."
In Wilko v. Swan,'8 on which both lower courts relied, the Su-
preme Court found that similar sections in the Securities Act of
1933"9 demonstrated a congressional determination that the special
protections against fraud afforded to security investors were more
important than prompt and economical solution of controversies
through arbitration."' Saying that judicial determination of such
disputes was necessary in order to preserve the effectiveness of the
statutory protections,' the Court found the arbitration clause void
as a "stipulation" that required Wilko to waive compliance with the
"provision" in the Act allowing buyers to sue in any state or federal
court.22
This conflict between statutory protections was handled differ-
ently in Scherk. The Court first noted several distinctions between
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which in themselves were sufficient to render Wilko inapposite.23
The Court, however, based its decision on other grounds. In essence,
the special advantages for securities investors in terms of remedies
and jurisdiction from which the Court in Wilko deduced the pri-
macy of the Securities Act over the Federal Arbitration Act were not
present to the same degree in the Securities Exchange Act.24
Rather than rule that the Wilko reasoning would be inapplica-
ble to all claims under the Securities Exchange Act, however, the
17. 484 F.2d 611, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1973).
18. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
19. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970) creates liability of sellers to
purchasers for selling securities in interstate commerce where there has been a material
falsehood or omission. Jurisdiction is concurrent in state and federal courts, with removal
from state courts prohibited. Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1971). The Act
also provides that:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any secu-
rity to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and
regulations of the Commission shall be void.
Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
20. 346 U.S. at 438 (1953). Since a plaintiff's advantages under the 1933 Act include
an explicit private remedy, multiple jurisdiction, non-removal from state courts, and burden
on the seller to show lack of scienter, waiver of these rights would be more detrimental here
than under other statutory claims not providing these advantages.
21. Id. at 435.
22. Id. at 434-35.
23. 94 S. Ct. at 2454.
24. Under the Securities Exchange Act, for example, there is no explicit provision for
private remedies, and jurisdiction is exclusively in the federal courts.
1975]
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Court confined its decision to claims involving international trans-
actions.25 Noting that the agreement in question was truly interna-
tional,2" the Court said that different policies and considerations
emanating from this status required enforcement of the arbitration
clause. First, having choice of forum and choice of law clauses in
international contracts should be encouraged as an "almost indis-
pensable precondition to necessary orderliness and predictability."27
Refusal to enforce arbitration clauses would result in an unseemly
jockeying for favorable forums, with destructive consequences to
international commerce.28 Second, the protections given buyers of
securities regarding remedies and jurisdiction by the Acts may be
chimerical in foreign transactions, since the opposing party can
speedily resort to foreign courts to block suits here until the arbitra-
tion is completed.2" Thus, the basic assumption of the Wilko deci-
sion could be invalidated in such cases. Third, the Court has held
that a forum selection clause should control absent a showing of
strong reasons why it should be set aside,3" and no such reason
existed in Scherk. Fourth, it would be unfair to let American parties
repudiate their solemn promises; upholding such disavowals would
be too "parochial."'" Finally, congressional support for this result
could be inferred from the recent adoption of the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. 2
The dissent argued that by applying the Securities Exchange
25. 94 S. Ct. at 2457.
26. Id. at 2455. Besides the different nationalities and residencies of the parties, the
negotiations were conducted in the United States, England, and Germany; the contract was
signed in Austria and closed in Switzerland; and the subject matter of the sale were busi-
nesses organized in Germany and Liechtenstein with activities in European markets.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2456.
29. Id.
30. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). Grounds for refusal to
enforce the forum clause were limited to showings that enforcement would be unreasonable
or unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such things as fraud or overreaching.
31. 94 S. Ct. at 2457. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972), the
Court said, "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."
32. 94 S. Ct. at 2457-58 n.15. The goal of the Convention is to encourage commercial
arbitration agreements in international transactions. The Court stated:
[w]e think that this country's adoption and ratification of the Convention and
the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act provide strongly
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Act first, the contradiction between the statutes was eliminated.3
Asserting that the transaction was a sale of securities under the
Securities Exchange Act,34 the dissent contended that any waiver of
the provision for remedy in federal courts was void under section
29(a),11 and without a valid arbitration clause, the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act did not apply.36 It also argued that even if the Federal
Arbitration Act were applicable, exceptions recognized by the Con-
vention and the Supreme Court37 required the Court to refuse to
enforce arbitration, because the agreement was void under the Se-
curities Exchange Act and contrary to strong public policy.38 The
dissent reemphasized the importance of the judiciary's role in ques-
tions of fraud and statutory interpretation,39 and asserted that the
result was, in effect, to deprive Alberto-Culver of its protection
under the Securities Exchange Act."0 Observing that several prior
federal court decisions have held that fraudulent acts of foreign
defendants subject them to the American securities laws, even
where there was only a minor degree of contact with this country,4'
the dissent averred that nothing justified this diluted version of the
laws where the only difference was the existence of an arbitration
clause. Finally, the dissent argued that this case could have omi-
nous results on international commerce because it would allow for-
eigners to profit from fraud by evading American courts. The dis-
sent asserted that only a change in the federal statutes should cause
33. Justice Douglas, former S.E.C. Commissioner, wrote for the dissent.
34. Id. at 2458-59. The dissent concluded this from the broad interpretative guidelines
in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) for determining what is a "security." While
a sale of the trademarks alone would not have made this a sale of securities, according to the
dissent, the sale of businesses whose principal assets were trademarks would.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1971).
36. 94 S. Ct. at 2461.
37. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See note 30 supra.
38. 94 S. Ct. at 2461, 2462-63 n.10. Article II, § 3 of the Convention, adopted under 9
U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1975), states that a country need not refer parties to arbitration pursuant
to their prior agreement if that agreement is "null and void, inoperable or incapable of being
performed." In The Bremen the Court acknowledged that a choice-of-forum clause should be
unenforceable if contrary to a strong public policy of the forum state, 407 U.S. at 15 (1972),
and the Scherk dissent believed requiring these securities claims to be determined in court
was such a policy.
39. 94 S. Ct. at 2463. Included were assertions that arbitrators are not qualified to
determine fraudulent misrepresentation, that no explanation or record of the result is re-
quired, that effective review of the decision is impossible, that extensive pretrial discovery
would be unavailable, and that wide choice of venue would be lost.
40. Id.
41. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Comment, The Transna-
tional Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (1973).
1975]
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such a diminution in the protection of securities investors. 2
The majority avoided considering the effect of the Securities
Exchange Act on the dispute on the grounds that it was precluded
from doing so in an appeal dealing only with a motion to stay court
action under 9 U.S.C. § 3.11 Under that section, a court should order
a stay if it is satisfied "that the issue involved . . . is referable to
arbitration under such an agreement." The Court had previously
held that, although the issue of fraud in the inducement of an arbi-
tration clause would be relevant in a motion to stay court action,
the issue of fraud in the inducement of an entire contract is properly
referable to arbitration.4 Since Alberto-Culver had alleged only the
latter type of fraud, the majority believed that the question of
whether the contract and/or the arbitration clause were void as
violations of the Securities Exchange Act should be resolved by the
arbitrators themselves. 5
Whether the Securities Exchange Act should apply to the mer-
its in the subsequent arbitration of the dispute in Paris or in any
subsequent court review remains unclear. The majority explicitly
stated that it was not deciding its applicability, either generally or
particularly. 6 Refusing to agree with the dissent that prior federal
court decisions were proper in holding American securities laws gen-
erally applicable to foreign parties accused of fraud regarding con-
tracts in which there were no choice-of-forum elements, the majority
felt even less reason existed to follow such decisions when forum-
selection clauses were included."7
42. 94 S. Ct. at 2464.
43. Id. at 2455 n.9.
44. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). See 94
S. Ct. at 2457 n.14.
45. Had the appeal been from a motion to enforce the arbitration in accordance with 9
U.S.C. § 2, which states that arbitration clauses are enforceable "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," the dissent would have been on
firmer grounds in asserting that the court should have determined whether the clause or the
contract would be unenforceable as void under the Securities Exchange Act. 94 S. Ct. at 2460.
However, even in enforcement cases the holdings have been to the contrary, i.e., fraud in the
inducement of a contract is still a proper issue for arbitration. See Erving v. Virginia Squires
Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Natl Life
Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 1969).
46. Regarding general application of the statute, see notes 47-48 infra. As to its specific
application, the Court denied that it decided or implied any opinion on whether the acquisi-
tion constituted a sale of securities under the Act. 94 S. Ct. at 2455 n.8.
47. At 94 S. Ct. at 2455, the Court said:
In this case. . . in the absence of the arbitration provision considerable uncer-
tainty existed at the time of the agreement, and still exists, concerning the law
applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of the contract.
See note 41 supra.
[Vol. 40
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In addition, neither the majority nor the dissent appeared to be
entirely convinced that the choice of the parties to have the "laws
of the State of Illinois, U.S.A." govern in the arbitration would, by
itself, entail the application of the Securities Exchange Act.4" Thus
it appears that the question remains open for resolution by the
arbitrators themselves, and their freedom in this matter can only be
reinforced by the equivocation in the decision as to the proper rules
to be applied. Still, it is probable that the choice of Illinois law
would be recognized by the arbitral body, 9 and that "Illinois law"
would include the Securities Exchange Act."
Whether the arbitral body ever selects or properly applies the
Securities Exchange Act as substantive law may never be known.
Court review of arbitration awards through enforcement or vacation
proceedings has been strictly limited, both by statute and case law.5'
Arbitrators need not give any explanation of their reasons for an
award.52 Errors in the application of the law are not normally re-
viewable. 3 Since Wilko, courts have believed that limited grounds
for nonstatutory review existed where there has been either a "mani-
fest disregard of the law"54 or an "irrational" award.5 As yet, how-
ever, these terms remain unclear, and their utilization has been
48. At 94 S. Ct. at 2456 n.10, the majority said:
.. .while the arbitration agreement involved here provided that the contro-
versies arising out of the agreement be resolved under "the laws of the State of
Illinois," . . . a determination of the existence and extent of fraud concerning the
trademarks would necessarily involve an understanding of foreign law on that sub-
ject.
At 94 S. Ct. at 2463 n.11, the dissent stated, "Even if the arbitration court should read this
clause [selecting the laws of Illinois] to require application of Rule 10b-5 standards ... "
49. See note 11 supra.
50. Federal law would apply to this case in Illinois since foreign commerce is involved.
51. Under 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970), review may only be based on assertions of corruption,
fraud, or undue means in procuring the award; partiality, corruption, misbehavior, or miscon-
duct on the part of the arbitrators; or the arbitrators having exceeded their powers or imper-
fectly executed them. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953); 6 C.J.S. Arbitration
and Award § 103 (1937).
52. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1972). See also I/S
Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 429 (2d Cir. 1974).
53. Office of Supply, Gov't of Korea v. New York Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d
Cir. 1972); Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.
1967).
54. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); see Comment, Commercial Arbitration
Under the FederalAct: Expanding the Scope of Judicial Review, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 799, 810-
12 (1974).
55. Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972);
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severly restricted. Additionally, while the Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,"6 states that
enforcement of an award may be refused on the grounds that it is
"contrary to public policy," the public policy defense has also been
narrowly construed.57 Thus, although the majority in Scherk im-
plied that the type of fraud alleged by Alberto-Culver could serve
as the basis for a challenge to an enforcement proceeding,58 it is
improbable that the opportunity would ever arise because of the
flexibility of the arbitration process. Evidently the Court still recog-
nizes that by completely opening up the arbitration process to judi-
cial review, it would simply be creating another form of lower court,
destroying the raison d'etre of arbitration in the process.59 Thus the
dissent would appear to be correct in asserting that enforcement of
arbitration would, in all likelihood, diminish the protection of secur-
ities investors.
The Scherk decision will have varying effects. In the area of
securities regulation, its principal, if not exclusive, impact should
be upon international transactions, but the full extent of such im-
pact has not been defined. Domestic American securities transac-
tions should be unaffected by Scherk, with the Wilko directives
remaining in force.6" Scherk's importance to the Federal Arbitration
Act is primarily negative; the Court refused to create yet another
exception to the clear language of the Act on the validity and en-
forceability of arbitration clauses. However, the decision may have
some liberalizing impact on judicial review of arbitral awards. In
view of the Court's suggestion that a determination on the issue of
fraud may be reviewable, perhaps now courts may be able to look
not only for "manifest disregard of the law," but also for improper
interpretation or application of the law." Finally, the case reem-
56. Art. V, § 2(b) adopted under 9 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1975).
57. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie de Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
58. 94 S. Ct. at 2457 n.14. The Court stated:
Although we do not decide the question, presumably the type of fraud alleged
here could be raised, under Art. V of the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. . . in challenging the enforcement of what-
ever arbitral award is produced through arbitration [as contrary to the public
policy of that country].
59. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-
99 (1960).
60. The Court specifically rejected the proposal of the dissenting judge in the court of
appeals to limit Wilko to transactions in which there is a disparity of bargaining power. 94
S. Ct. at 2454 n.6.
61. See note 58 supra.
[Vol. 40
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phasized the importance of foreign relations and conflicts of law
factors to the Court. The decision to practice a policy of restraint
where foreign parties are involved has become a significant trend in
the American position on jurisdiction in transnational situations.2
The price of increasing "the orderliness and predictability essential
to any international business transaction"6 will probably be less
protection for American investors against fraud in foreign com-
merce.
In Scherk the Court could have considered and advanced the
law of arbitration and securities protection to a considerable degree.
It chose, however, to confine the decision to narrow grounds and to
leave the particularly troublesome problems of arbitration review
and securities regulation in international transactions to later cases.
JOHN S. PLETZ
62. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
63. 94 S. Ct. at 2455.
1975]
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AMENDMENT-SUITS AGAINST THE STATE
Edelman v. Jordan'
John Jordan filed a class action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief against two former directors of the Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Aid, the Director of the Cook County Department
of Public Aid, and the Comptroller of Cook County. These Illinois
officials, who administered the state and federally-funded programs
of Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD), 2 allegedly con-
ducted the programs in a manner inconsistent with various federal
regulations and the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. Jordan contended that the directors, by administering
the program according to state regulations,3 did not process and
approve AABD grants within the federal time limits.4 The district
court issued a permanent injunction, requiring compliance with the
federal time limits and also ordered the state to remit AABD bene-
fits wrongfully withheld to all persons found eligible. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,5 rejecting the state's con-
tention that the eleventh amendment barred the awarding of retro-
active benefits.' The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 deci-
sion, affirmed that portion of the holding requiring prospective com-
pliance with the federal time limits, but held that the eleventh
amendment precludes retroactive award of public assistance bene-
fits.7
The eleventh amendment' was enacted in response to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.' In Chisholm, the
Court held that a state could be sued in federal court by a citizen
1. - U.S. , 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (1970). The AABD program was replaced effective January 1,
1974. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. 1973).
3. The Illinois regulations are found in the ILuNois CATEGORICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL OF
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC Am §§ 4004.1, 8255, 8255.1.
4. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973).
5. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
6. Id. at 995.
7. 94 S. Ct. at 1356-57.
8. The eleventh amendment, as ratified in 1798, provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
9. 1 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
10
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of another state in assumpsit. This decision ran counter to the posi-
tion taken by many advocates of the federal government at the time
of the Constitution's adoption"0 that the federal judiciary could not
summon a state as defendant and adjudicate its rights and liabili-
ties without its consent. Consequently, at the first meeting of Con-
gress thereafter, the eleventh amendment was proposed and in due
course adopted. Although the amendment does not expressly bar
suits against a state by its own citizens, the eleventh amendment
has been construed to bar suits in federal court against an uncon-
senting state by its own citizens." Furthermore, even though the
state is not a named party, a suit may nevertheless be barred by the
eleventh amendment if the state is the real party in interest."
This constitutional immunity was the general rule for suits
against a state until the landmark decision of Ex parte Young.'" In
Young, a state attorney general was enjoined from enforcing a stat-
ute which the Court held unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that
the use of the state's name to enforce an unconstitutional law was
an act without authority and, therefore, the official seeking to en-
force the void statute did not represent the state in its sovereign
capacity. The attorney general was "stripped of his official or repre-
sentative character" and "subjected in his person to the conse-
quences of his individual conduct."" Accordingly, the action was
not a "suit against a state" and the Court refused to extend the
eleventh amendment's immunity to the state official.
In Rothstein v. Wyman,"5 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a retrospective award of public assistance benefits
was in fact a suit against the state because it would require a pay-
10. See Madison, in 3 ELLIor's DEBATEs ON THE FEDERL CoNsrrUTION 533 (1788); THE
FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
11. Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251
U.S. 311 (1920); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). But see Justice Brennan's dissent in
Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. at 1367, where he argued that the eleventh amendment did not
apply because its language could not be judicially altered. See also McCartney v. West
Virginia, 156 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946). See Note, Private Suits Against States in the Federal
Courts, 33 CH. L. REv. 331, 334-35 (1966), for the proposition that Hans v. Louisiana was
not decided on grounds creating a constitutional immunity, but was actually based on com-
mon law sovereign immunity.
12. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign
immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.
Id. at 464.
13. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
14. Id. at 159.
15. 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973).
1975]
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ment of funds out of the state treasury." However, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in its consideration of Jordan,'7
found that the retroactive award of public assistance benefits did
not amount to a suit against the state, but was a logical extension
of Ex parte Young.'"
The Supreme Court in Jordan accepted the theory that, even
where an individual is the named defendant, retrospective relief
that requires payment of funds from the state treasury is a suit
against the state which is barred by the eleventh amendment." The
Court noted that the funds to satisfy the retrospective award in
Jordan would inevitably come from the general revenues of Illinois. 0
Therefore, the award resembled a monetary award against the state
itself, which is barred by the eleventh amendment. 21 Apparently,
the Court considered the crucial fact to be that the retrospective
award would not be paid personally by the state official. 22 In affirm-
ing the prospective injunctive relief in Jordan, on the other hand,
the Court applied the reasoning used in Ex parte Young, saying that
the officer was stripped of his official character and as an individual
could be compelled to bring his conduct in conformity with federal
16. Id. at 241.
17. 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
18. Id. at 991. Accord, Silvey v. Roberts, 363 F. Supp. 1006 (M.D. Fla. 1973), holding
that retroactive benefits should be available to the class of plaintiffs when the state's policy
is clearly inconsistent with federal regulations. But see Like v. Carter, 486 F.2d 552 (8th Cir.
1973); Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973); Frye v. Lukehard, 364 F. Supp. 1379
(W.D. Va. 1973), where the courts denied retroactive public benefits awards on grounds that
the states were immune under the eleventh amendment. The court of appeals in Jordan noted
four summary affirmances by the Supreme Court allowing retroactive relief, where the Court
did not address itself to the eleventh amendment question. 472 F.2d at 989. See Sterrett v.
Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809 (1972); State Dep't of Health & Rehabilita-
tive Services v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1969); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). A summary affirmance is a decision on the merits having
precedential value. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (1974), and cases cited therein.
19. 94 S. Ct. at 1358. See also Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973).
20. Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, quoted from Judge McGowan's opinion in
Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1972):
It is not pretended that these payments are to come from the personal resources
of appellants. Appellees expressly contemplate that they will, rather, involve sub-
stantial expenditures from the public funds of the state . ...
94 S, Ct. at 1356.
21. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor
Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47 (1944).
22. 94 S. Ct. at 1356.
12




The Court emphasized the fact that the AABD program is de-
signed to satisfy bare minimal needs of participants during a certain
time period. The Court followed Judge McGowan's position as
stated in Rothstein: "As time goes by . . .retroactive payments
become compensatory rather than remedial; the coincidence be-
tween previously ascertained and existing needs becomes less
clear." 4 The Court implied that the needs of an applicant during
the time funds were wrongfully withheld must necessarily have been
satisfied elsewhere if the applicant has survived through the period.
Consequently, the applicant has no further need for the state's sup-
port during that time period. Because the need no longer exists, the
benefits become similar to damages which must be paid by the
state. 25 The Court viewed the retroactive award as a type of compen-
satory damages against the state, rather than a method of returning
welfare recipients to the status quo. 2 The eleventh amendment
grants the states immunity from federal court suits for compensa-
tory damages.
Jordan does not, however, preclude the possibility of retroactive
relief in all cases. The Court merely limited the potential scope of
Ex parte Young.? The Court indicated that two additional, highly
restrictive exceptions to eleventh amendment immunity exist and
would be available in awarding retroactive relief. The first exception
deals with congressional approval of a program that involves state
participation; it is dependent on Congress' intention to abrogate the
state's immunity, and the state's constructive consent to this abro-
gation of immunity by participating in the federal program.28 The
23. But the relief awarded in Ex parte Young was prospective only; the Attor-
ney General of Minnesota was enjoined to conform his future conduct of that office
to the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such relief is analogous to that
awarded by the District Court in the prospective portion of its order under review
in this case.
Id.
24. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921
(1973).
25. However, Justice Douglas, in dissent, contended that most welfare decisions by
federal courts have a financial impact on the states. According to Douglas, because the Illinois
official must nevertheless spend state funds to bring his conduct in line with the federal
regulations, the prospective/retroactive distinction is irrelevant and the eleventh amendment
is no bar. 94 S. Ct. at 1364-65.
26. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that upholding the district court's
award was permissible as a form of "equitable restitution." 94 S. Ct. at 1357.
27. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
28. See Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
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Court clearly indicated that this possibility is still available, but
rejected such an argument on the facts of Jordan." The second
exception is the situation where a state waives its constitutional
immunity. However, waiver will be found only where there is ex-
press language or such overwhelming implication that there is no
other reasonable conclusion."
The impact of Edelman v. Jordan will be felt widely throughout
three interested sectors: the federal government and agencies, state
government and agencies, and welfare recipients. As was noted in
Rothstein, court-ordered retroactive relief serves three congressional
interests: (1) deterring willful state violations of federal require-
ments; (2) insuring proper use of federal funds; and (3) promoting
the federal policy of satisfying the ascertained needs of impover-
ished individuals.' Jordan's denial of retrospective awards will un-
dermine the first two interests and possibly the third. The only
federal remedy available to deter willful state violations after
Jordan is to cut off federal funds, a drastic sanction which the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is reluctant to use.32
If the states are not held responsible for funds which are wrongfully
withheld, they can defy federal regulations with no sanction other
than an order that future conduct be in accordance with federal
regulations. Furthermore, a determination of wrongdoing may not
be made until sometime after suit has been filed, allowing violations
to continue for months or even years.3 If the federal government
cannot deter willful violations of its regulations, there is little or no
power to guarantee proper use of federal funds. Whether the third
congressional interest is undermined depends on whether Congress
views the unsatisfied needs of impoverished individuals during the
period the funds were wrongfully withheld as no longer ascertain-
29. 94 S. Ct. at 1360. Justice Marshal, in dissent, contended that Congress intended to
provide public aid recipients with a cause of action and that Illinois' agreement to participate
was also an agreement to submit to suit in federal court. Congressional intent was arguably
demonstrated by congressional adoption of the AABD program and HEW regulations which
require the states to make corrective payments after successful "fair hearings" and provide
for federal matching funds to satisfy federal court orders of retroactive payments. 94 S. Ct.
at 1368-69. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For relevant HEW regulations, see 45 C.F.R. §
205.10(b)(2)-(3) (1973).
30. 94 S. Ct. at 1361. See also Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944);
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909).
31. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 1972).
32. 94 S. Ct. at 1370.
33. In Edelman v. Jordan, Illinois operated the program under time limits which were
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able and thus not due the applicant.34 The result is that the indi-
vidual welfare recipient has no remedy for wrongfully withheld
payments under Jordan, despite the fact that Goldberg. v. Kelly"
indicates that public assistance benefits are a right which requires
due process protection before termination. A private individual
seeking benefits due him is left to the caprice of the state agency
and officials who administer the program.
In conclusion, although recent decisions had indicated that
eleventh amendment immunity would not be applied as broadly as
in the past,36 Jordan appears to limit this trend of allowing suits
against states in federal court. States now have the assurance that
they will not be subject to suits for retroactive relief in federal court.
Furthermore, the Court has given added weight to the proposition
that modern writers recognize as the only valid grounds for sover-
eign immunity and the eleventh amendment-noninterference with
state government operation. In particular, the Court appears to be
concerned about causing the fiscal bankruptcy of the states.
Jordan appears to indicate an easy solution to the eleventh
amendment problem by the characterization of relief sought as
"prospective" rather than "retroactive." Yet this distinction cannot
reconcile the two conflicting policies which are deeply imbedded in
the judicial system and at the root of the eleventh amendment
problem. One is the practice of providing a federal forum for the
vindication of federal rights; the other is the policy of shielding the
sovereign from suit. In its effort to protect state treasuries, the Court
has blocked the use of the federal government's most effective moni-
toring device38 over state administration of federal funds in federal-
state "matching funds" programs. A state may willfully fail to
comply with federal guidelines without risk of retrospective conse-
quences. Jordan deprives individuals of benefits to which they are
34. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
35. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
36. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184
(1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
37. See, e.g., K. DAviS, AnmnNIsTRATIv LAW § 27.02 (3d ed. 1972).
38. Congress can retain some measure of control over its spending policies by requiring
waiver of immunity with respect to particular programs. However, Congress has done so
infrequently in the past.
39. As of 1971, there were over 500 separate programs which annually distributed more
than $30 billion in the form of categorical grants which feature federal "matching funds"
administered by the state. OFFIcE OF ECONOMIC OpponRUrry, CATALOGUE OF FEDERAL Assis-
TANCE PROGRAMS (1967). See Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, Revenue
Sharing - An Idea Whose Time Has Come 7 (1970).
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entitled and opens federal "matching funds" programs to potential
abuses.
JOHN G. YOUNG, JR.
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CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE CONFESSIONS-
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION IN MISSOURI
State v. Wright1
The defendant, Roy Lee Wright, age 15, was arrested in connec-
tion with a robbery and homicide. He was subsequently taken to the
juvenile court building where he was turned over to the custody of
the juvenile court.2 The juvenile authorities allowed the police to
interrogate the defendant at the juvenile center in the presence of a
juvenile officer and defendant's mother. Prior to the questioning,
the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights and asked,
after each part of the Miranda warning, if he understood. He said
that he understood, that he did not want an attorney, and that he
would make a statement. He then admitted his participation in the
planning and commission of the robbery.3
The juvenile court, after determining that Wright was not a
proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Code, certified
him for trial as an adult.4 He was charged with first degree murder.
At trial, the court found that the defendant had knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to remain silent. The confession was
admitted into evidence. Defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree.5
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
defendant's confession was properly admitted into evidence.' The
1. 515 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
2. Id. at 423.
Wright was not taken to the juvenile court immediately after his arrest because he told
the police he was 17. When Mrs. Wright, the defendant's mother, was telephoned, she in-
formed the police that he was 15 or 16. He was then immediately delivered to the custody of
the juvenile court.
3. 515 S.W.2d at 423.
4. Section 221.071, RSMo 1969, provides:
In the discretion of the judge of the juvenile court, when any petition under
sections 211.011 to 211.431 alleges that a child of the age of fourteen years or older
has committed an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, or that
the child has violated a state or municipal traffic law or ordinance or that a minor
between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one years over whom the juvenile court
has jurisdiction has violated any state law or municipal ordinance, the petition may
be dismissed and such child or minor may be prosecuted under the general law,
whenever the judge after receiving the report of the investigation required by sec-
tions 211.011 to 211.431 and hearing evidence finds that such child or minor is not
a proper subject to be dealt with under the provisions of sections 211.011 to 211.431.
The defendant had allegedly been involved with the juvenile court on 42 previous occasions.
5. 515 S.W.2d at 422.
6. Prior to being informed of his fifth and sixth amendment rights, the defendant had
answered one question posed by the police about a shotgun used in the robbery. Defendant
17
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court rejected defendant's assertion that section 211.271(3), RSMo
1969,1 operated as an absolute bar to the admission into evidence
of statements made by juveniles while they were in the custody of
the juvenile court. The court held that after a juvenile is informed
of his fifth and sixth amendment rights and made aware that the
questioning authorities are his adversaries and that criminal respon-
sibility may result from any statement he makes, his statements are
admissible in evidence against him in a subsequent criminal trial.8
The use of a juvenile's statements, made while he is in the
custody of the juvenile court, against him in an adult, criminal
proceeding is inconsistent with the nature of the juvenile court sys-
tem. The philosophy underlying the Juvenile Code is that the state
assumes the role of parens patriae toward the juvenile offender.' The
juvenile court's task is not to determine guilt or innocence, but to
rehabilitate the wayward youth. To this end, he is dealt with in the
manner best calculated to achieve the goal of reforming him, rather
than punishing him.'0 Consistent with this purpose, juvenile pro-
ceedings are deemed civil rather than criminal," juvenile records are
contended that under Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), this tainted and made
inadmissible his later confession. Although an opinion was written and adopted in Division
One of the Missouri Supreme Court reversing the conviction on this ground, the opinion was
not adopted after reargument en banc. 515 S.W.2d at 424.
7. Section 211.271(3), RSMo 1969, provides:
After a child is taken into custody as provided in section 211.131, all admis-
sions, confessions, and statements by the child to the juvenile officer and juvenile
court personnel and all evidence given in cases under this chapter, as well as all
reports and records of the juvenile court, are not lawful or proper evidence against
the child and shall not be used for any purpose whatsoever in any proceeding, civil
or criminal, other than proceedings under this chapter.
8. 515 S.W.2d at 430-31.
9. The Juvenile Act is rooted in the concept of parens patriae, that the state will
supplant the natural parents when they fail in their role. The dominant purpose is clearly
stated in § 211.011, RSMo 1969, and carries through the entire act. In re F... C----, 484
S.W.2d 21, 25 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
10. Section 211.011, RSMo 1969, states:
1. The purpose of sections 211.011 to 211.431 is to facilitate the care, protec-
tion and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. Sections 211.011 to 211.431 should be liberally construed, therefore, to the
end that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive
such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will conduce to the
child's welfare and the best interests of the state and that when such child is
removed from the control of his parents the court shall secure for him care as nearly
as possible equivalent to that which should have been given him by them.
11. The Missouri Juvenile Act is neither criminal nor penal in its nature. State v.
Harold, 364 Mo. 1052, 1058, 271 S.W.2d 527, 530 (1954). For a list of jurisdictions holding
that juvenile proceedings are not criminal, see Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-62
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
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kept confidential,12 and youthful offenders are encouraged to com-
municate freely and openly with juvenile officers and other juvenile
court personnel.1 3
However, not all juvenile offenders remain in the custody of the
juvenile court. In some cases, the juvenile court, having found the
defendant to be an improper subject to be dealt with under the
Juvenile Code, will certify him for trial as an adult.14 When certified
for trial as an adult, a juvenile who has responded to the juvenile
officer's plea for open communication by providing a detailed ac-
count of his part in the crime may find, at his criminal trial, that
he has provided the state with its best evidence against him. Thus,
there is a need to protect the juvenile from having his prior
Since juvenile proceedings were deemed civil rather than criminal, early cases held that
the constitutional rights of an accused did not attach to juvenile defendants. See, e.g., Ex
parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 726, 41 S.W.2d 176, 178 (En Banc 1931); State ex rel. Matacia
v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359, 363, 254 S.W. 179, 181 (En Banc 1923); Minor Children of F.B. v.
Carruthers, 323 S.W.2d 397, 400 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959). This view was rejected by the
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment was held applicable to juvenile proceedings. See In re M__ C__, 504
S.W.2d 641 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when charged with a violation of the criminal law. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
have been held applicable to interrogations of children in juvenile proceedings. See Lopez v.
United States, 399 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1968); State v. Stevens, 467 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1971); State
v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970).
A good overview of the juvenile court system in the United States is S. Fox, THE LAW OF
JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL (1971). For suggestions as to the attorney's role in represent-
ing juvenile defendants, see McMillian & McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the
Juvenile Court-Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 ST. L.U.L.J. 561 (1970); Scheppner, You
Have a Juvenile Matter Today, 29 J. Mo. B. 386 (1973); Comment, Representing the Juvenile
Defendant in Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST. L. U.L.J. 424 (1968); Comment, Representing the
Juvenile in the Adjudicatory Hearing, 12 ST. L. U. L.J. 466 (1968).
For one author's view of the Missouri procedures in light of these developments, see
Habiger, Prosecution of Children in Missouri Poses Constitutional Problems, 30 J. Mo. B.
11 (1974).
12. Section 211.321(1), RSMo 1969, provides:
The proceedings of the juvenile court shall be entered in a book kept for that
purpose and known as the juvenile records. These records as well as all information
obtained and social records prepared in the discharge of official duty for the court
shall be open to inspection only by order of the court to persons having a legitimate
interest therein.
13. The atmosphere in the juvenile court has been described as: "the nonadversary,
nonpunitive atmosphere of the juvenile system. . . " State v. O'Neill, 216 N.W.2d 822, 829
(Minn. 1974);". . . the relaxed, friendly, parens patriae relationship which. . . is character-
istic of the juvenile court approach . . . " 515 S.W.2d at 435; "the relaxed, non-adversary
atmosphere of the juvenile interrogation ... " State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Mo.
1970).
14. See § 211.071, RSMo 1969, quoted note 4 supra.
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communications, made in the relaxed atmosphere of the juvenile
court system, used against him in a subsequent, adult prosecution.
Section 211.271(3) was enacted in 1957 to provide this needed pro-
tection.'- As enacted, section 211.271(3) provided that "evidence
given in cases" under the Juvenile Code is not admissible in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding. 6 Section 211.271(3) was amended in
1969. It is this amendment which was in issue in Wright. However,
the interpretation of section 211.271(3) prior to the amendment is
important.
Missouri first considered the use of a juvenile's statements in a
later criminal proceeding in the Arbeiter cases, hereafter referred to
as Arbeiter I, II, and I1.17 Arbeiter I dealt with statements obtained
from a juvenile by the police before the juvenile was turned over to
the juvenile court authorities. The court held the statements inad-
missible because the police failed to comply with section 211.061,
which required that an arrested juvenile be brought immediately
before a juvenile court or juvenile officer. 8 The court held that any
and all statements obtained prior to delivering the youth to the
juvenile authorities are inadmissible in a later adult criminal prose-
cution.1 The court expressly reserved the question of the admissibil-
ity of statements obtained from a juvenile by the police after com-
pliance with section 211.061.20 Thus, the exclusionary rule of
Arbeiter I applies only where section 211.061 of the Juvenile Code
has been violated.
Arbeiter IF' involved the prosecuting attorney's attempt to gain
access to the juvenile court records of the defendant, who was then
15. Section 211.271(3), RSMo 1959, (subsequently amended) provided:
Evidence given in cases under sections 211.011 to 211.431 is not lawful or proper
evidence against the child for any purpose whatever in a civil, criminal or other
proceeding except in subsequent cases under sections 211.011 to 211.431.
16. Id.
17. These cases dealt with the statements of a fifteen year old boy. State v. Arbeiter,
408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966) (referred to as Arbeiter 1); State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427
S.W.2d 371 (Mo. En Banc 1968) (referred to as Arbeiter II); and State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d
827 (Mo. 1970) (referred to as Arbeiter III).
18. Section 211.061, RSMo 1969, provides:
1. When a child is taken into custody with or without a warrant for an offense,
the child together with any information concerning him and the personal property
found in his possession, shall be taken immediately and directly before the juvenile
court or delivered to the juvenile officer or person acting for him.
19. 408 S.W.2d 26, 29-30 (Mo. 1966).
20. Id. at 31. See also Hamby v. State, 454 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Mo. En Banc 1970), stating
that unless the record affirmatively shows compliance with § 211.061, a confession obtained
while the juvenile was in custody would be inadmissible.
21. State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
[Vol. 40
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facing prosecution as an adult. The court concluded that the prose-
cutor was entitled to the information in the juvenile court file, even
though it had been prepared by juvenile court personnel while they
had custody of the defendant. 2 The court did not, however, decide
whether these records could be used as evidence in the defendant's
adult criminal trial.2
This question was squarely presented in Arbeiter iii where
the defendant appealed his conviction, contending that the infor-
mation found in his juvenile court file was improperly admitted into
evidence at trial. The court held that section 211.271(3)25 rendered
a juvenile's statements to a juvenile officer inadmissible in his crim-
inal trial. The court stated that although the phrase "evidence given
in cases '26 did not expressly refer to statements made to juvenile
court personnel, such statements were within the statutory prohibi-
tion.? The court pointed out that the parens patriae concept would
be endangered by allowing juvenile court personnel to obtain state-
ments from a juvenile in the friendly, open surroundings of the
juvenile interrogation and then admit these statements against the
juvenile in subsequent criminal proceedings.?
In State v. Sinderson,2 9 a juvenile in the custody of a juvenile
officer made statements to the police which were used against him
in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The defendant, relying on
Arbeiter III and section 211.271(3), contended that these statements
were inadmissible." The court rejected this argument and held that
statements made to the police by a juvenile in the presence of his
mother and the juvenile officer were properly admissible." Arbeiter
III was distinguished because Sinderson's statements were not made
to a juvenile officer in the friendly atmosphere of a juvenile interro-
gation, without any warning as to the potential consequences of
making a statement. Sinderson was given a constitutionally ade-
quate warning of his rights, was advised of the consequences of
making a statement, and was aware that the police were operating
22. Id. at 378. See § 211.321(1), RSMo 1969, quoted note 12 supra.
23. 427 S.W.2d at 378.
24. State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1970).
25. See § 211.271(3), RSMo 1959, quoted note 15 supra.
26. Id.
27. 449 S.W.2d at 632-33.
28. Id. at 633.
29. 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970).
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as his adversaries and not as his friends.12 Because there was no
potential abuse of the parens patriae concept under these circum-
stances, the court concluded that section 211.271(3) did not require
the exclusion of the defendant's statements from evidence.33
Section 211.271(3), which prohibited the use in later criminal
proceedings of "evidence given in cases" under the Juvenile Code,
was amended in 1969. The amendment expanded the reference to
"evidence given in cases" to prohibit expressly the use of "state-
ments by the child to the juvenile officer and juvenile court person-
nel . . . as well as all reports and records of the juvenile court" as
evidence in a subsequent criminal trial.34 Known as the "Arbeiter
amendment," this legislation apparently answered the question
expressly reserved by the court in Arbeiter 11.31 The amended statute
was passed before the appellate decisions in Arbeiter HI and
Sinderson, but was not applicable to either of these cases because
the trial convictions were handed down prior to the effective date
of the amendment. Since the language of the amended statute was
in accord with the result in Arbeiter III, the question presented in
Wright was whether the amendment had changed the result in
Sinderson, from which Wright was factually indistinguishable.
In Wright, the court held that amended section 211.271(3) did
not prohibit the admission into evidence of a juvenile's statements
made to police officers while in the custody of the juvenile court. 6
In interpreting the amended statute in this way, the court relied on
the legislative history and the express language of the amendment.
The court concluded that the purpose of the amendment was to
answer the question reserved in Arbeiter I and II, that is, whether
statements to juvenile court personnel, made by a juvenile in the
custody of the juvenile court, are admissible against the juvenile in
a subsequent criminal proceeding. 8 The court rejected the argu-
ment that the amendment was intended to cover all statements
32, Id.
33. Id, at 492-93.
34. Compare § 211.271(3), RSMo 1969, quoted note 7 supra, with § 211.271(3), RSMo
1959, quoted note 15 supra.
35. During oral argument in Wright, counsel admitted that the amendment to §
211.271(3) was referred to as the "Arbeiter amendment." 515 S.W.2d at 428 n.8. Judge Seiler,
dissenting, agreed with the majority that the amendment was intended to close a potential
"loophole" with respect to statements made to juvenile officers by juveniles in their custody.
515 S.W.2d at 434.
36. 515 S.W.2d at 430-31.
37. Id. at 427, 429.
38. Id. at 428-29.
[Vol. 40
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made by the juvenile while in the custody of the juvenile authori-
ties.39 In interpreting the statute strictly, the court pointed out that
the Missouri legislature could have prohibited the use of any
statements made by juveniles under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, but did not. The court viewed itself as bound by what the
legislature said, not what it might have said. 0
This interpretation of amended section 211.271(3) agrees with
the express language of the statute. In addition, the interpretation
seems to harmonize with the doctrine of parens patriae. As long as
the juvenile is aware that he is in an adversary situation, that the
people with whom he is dealing are not his friends and that any
statements he makes may be used against him in a criminal pro-
ceeding, there is no danger that he may have been misled by the
relaxed atmosphere of the juvenile court process.4
39. Id. at 429-30. The court refused to adopt the per se exclusionary rule announced in
Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). This rule would exclude all state-
ments made by a juvenile in the custody of the juvenile court from evidence in all proceedings
except those under the Juvenile Code. The Harling court emphasized that the juvenile court
provides a separate system for dealing with juvenile offenders. In their view, the protection
of this separate system requires the exclusion of all such statements from evidence because
of the:
flexible and informal procedures of the Juvenile Court which are essential to its
parens patriae function. To avoid impairment of this function, the juvenile proceed-
ing must be insulated from the adult proceeding. This requires that admissions by
a juvenile in connection with the non-criminal proceeding be excluded from evi-
dence in the criminal proceeding.
295 F.2d at 164. The Harling approach was considered and rejected by Missouri in State v.
Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486, 493 (Mo. 1970). See also State v. O'Neill, 216 N.W.2d 822, 829
(Minn. 1974); State v. Stevens, 467 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Mo. 1971); State v. Gullings, 244 Ore.
173, 176, 416 P.2d 311, 313 (1966) (quoted with approval in Sinderson and Wright); State v.
Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 526, 533, 463 P.2d 640, 644 (1970).
40. 515 S.W.2d at 429.
41. Id. at 430-31. The police do not occupy a parens patriae relationship toward the
juevnile offender; they are not concerned with the best interests of the child, but with law
enforcement. Thus, they are not a part of the friendly surroundings of the juvenile court. So
long as the juvenile offender is aware that he is talking to the police and not to juvenile court
personnel, there is no danger that he will be lulled into a false sense of security by the relaxed,
informal approach of the juvenile court system.
It is not clear whether merely informing the juvenile that he is talking to the police and
not juvenile court personnel is sufficient to make him aware that the questioning authorities
are his adversaries rather than his friends. It would seem that to ensure he is fully aware of
the consequences of his statements a more detailed warning should be required, for example:
These gentlemen are police officers and they would like to ask you some ques-
tions. You do not have to answer any of their questions and, if you answer any
questions, you may refuse to answer any further questions at any time. Any answers
you give may not only be used against you in juvenile court, but can also be used
against you in a criminal trial if you are certified and tried as an adult.
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However, even though the court's interpretation seems to recog-
nize the intention of the legislature and the philosophy of the juve-
nile court, it does leave two problems unanswered. First, authoriz-
ing the juvenile officer to permit the police to question a juvenile
creates a conflict of interest. The juvenile officer is charged with
protecting the juvenile's interests. Interrogation by the police is,
arguably, not in the best interests of the juvenile defendant. Thus,
authorizing the juvenile officer to permit police interrogation may
place him in the position of not acting in the juvenile's best inter-
ests.4" In their dissent in Wright, Judges Seiler and Bardgett express
their fear that this type of police involvement with juvenile court
personnel and juvenile offenders will tend to pierce the barrier
which has been established between the juvenile court system and
the adult criminal process. In their view, the legislature has pro-
vided that a juvenile, whether guilty or not, should be treated differ-
ently from an adult until the juvenile court determines that he is
not amenable to the juvenile process and waives jurisdiction over
him. They argue that the juvenile should not be exposed to a police
interrogation until he has been released from the custody of the
juvenile court." Second, there is serious doubt as to the capacity of
a juvenile defendant to effectively, knowingly, and intelligently
waive his constitutional rights. 5
However, until the legislature provides that all statements
made by a juvenile in the custody of the juvenile court shall be
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, statements made by a juve-
nile to the police while the juvenile is in the custody of the juvenile
42. State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421, 435 (Mo. En Banc 1974) (dissenting opinion). As
a practical matter, the police will be interested in interrogating a juvenile for the purpose of
obtaining statements which will be admissible against him in a criminal proceeding in those
cases where they suspect the juvenile will be certified for trial as an adult by the juvenile
court. Since this is precisely the situation where the juvenile will need the maximum protec-
tion of his interests and where the juvenile authorities will have a minimal interest in protect-
ing the defendant, it may well be that the juvenile officer in this type of case would not be
an adequate guardian of the juvenile's interests.
43. 515 S.W.2d at 437.
44. Id.
45. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 39, 54 (1970).
Furthermore, even the presence of the juvenile's parents at the interrogation may not provide
adequate protection of the child's rights. See S. Fox, THE LAW OF JUVENILE COURTS IN A
NUTSHELL 129 (1971). However, case law in Missouri clearly stands for the proposition that a
juvenile can waive his rights. The presence or absence of an adult "friend" is apparently one
of the factors to be considered under the "totality of the circumstances." See State v. Stevens,
467 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Mo. 1971) (waiver by a 14 year-old held effective); State v. Sinderson,
455 S.W.2d 486, 492-93 (Mo. 1970) (waiver by a 14 year-old held effective).
[Vol. 40
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/6
RECENT CASES
authorities will be admissible in evidence in a subsequent criminal
trial if the following requirements are satisfied:
1. Immediately after his arrest, the juvenile must have been
taken before the juvenile judge or delivered to the juvenile officer."
2. The statements made by the juvenile were not communica-
tions between the child and a juvenile officer or juvenile court per-
sonnel.4"
3. Prior to making the statements, the juvenile was apprised
of his fifth and sixth amendment rights," fully advised of the poten-
tial consequences of any statements he might make to the police,4"
and made aware that the interrogation was being conducted in an
adversary situation."0
JAMES E. ROBERTSON
46. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966) and § 211.061, RSMo 1969. The record
must affirmatively show compliance with these requirements for any statements made by the
juvenile to be admissible. Hamby v. State, 454 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
47. State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1970) and § 211.271(3), RSMo 1969. In
Wright, 515 S.W.2d at 430, the court stated:
The mere presence of the juvenile officer to warn the youth of his rights and
to make sure they were accorded to him, when all the facts and circumstances are
considered, did not make the confession to the police officer a statement to the
juvenile officer.
This suggests that any active participation in the interrogation by the juvenile officer might
"taint" the statements made by the juvenile and bring them within the ambit of § 211.271(3).
Apparently, statements made by the child in an honest, but mistaken, belief that he was
communicating with juvenile authorities would also be within the coverage of § 211.271(3).
Finally, application of the Hamby rule, note 46 supra, would further safeguard the juvenile's
interests.
48. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); State v. Stevens, 467 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1971); State
v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970). This is also required where the juvenile is communi-
cating with the juvenile authorities, if there is a possibility of commitment to a state institu-
tion for juveniles. In reM __ C -, 504 S.W.2d 641, 647 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
49. State v. Rone, 515 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. En Banc 1974) (decided concurrently with
Wright); State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. En Banc 1974); see State v. McMillian, 514
S.W.2d 528 (Mo. En Banc 1974) (also decided with Wright) (confession of a juvenile held
inadmissible because the warning dealt only with what the juvenile court could do-with the
defendant, not with the possibility that he could be certified for trial and prosecuted as an
adult under the criminal law); State v. Ross, 516 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974)
(conviction reversed because the juvenile defendant was not warned before the interrogation
of the possibility that he might be bound over to the circuit court to be tried as an adult).
50. State v. Rone, 515 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. En Banc 1974); State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d
421 (Mo. En Banc 1974); State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970).
1975]
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DUE PROCESS-THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE IN
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS
Haas v. Haas'
On May 1, 1970 a writing purporting to be the last will and
testament of Ervin Frank Haas was admitted to probate, and letters
testamentary were issued. The first publication of notice to creditors
was on May 6, 1970, and proof of publication of notice was filed May
27, 1970. A stamped, unmailed post card in the form of notice of
issuance of letters testamentary addressed to Ervin A. Haas,
"address unknown," was in the probate file. On October 5, 1971,
Ervin A. Haas, testator's son and recipient of one dollar under the
will, filed a petition to contest the will. Petitioner alleged that a
coexecutor of the estate knew that petitioner was incarcerated in the
federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, but that petitioner
had not been given personal notice of the probate proceedings; thus
he alleged that he had not been given notice reasonably calculated
to apprise him of the pending proceedings and that such failure
amounted to a denial of due process. The trial court dismissed the
petition with prejudice because it was filed more than six months
after the first publication of notice of the issuance of letters testa-
mentary.2 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.
Appellant's major contention on appeal was that, absent a re-
quirement of due diligence on the part of an applicant for letters
testamentary to ascertain the whereabouts of heirs, devisees, or le-
gatees, the quality of notice required by sections 473.0171 and
473.033,4 RSMo 1969, does not satisfy due process requirements.
1. 504 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1973).
2. Section 473.083(5), RSMo 1969, provided, "[i]f no person appears within the time
aforesaid [six months], then probate or rejection of the will is binding . . . ." This statute
has since been amended; however, a similar provision may be found in section 473.083(1),
RSMo 1973 Supp.
3. Section 473.017.1, RSMo 1973 Supp., provides in part:
An application for letters testamentary or of administration shall be verified by
applicant and shall state:
(2) The names, relationship to decedent, and residence addresses of the sur-
viving spouse and heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent. . . and if applicant
has reason to believe that there are any heirs or devisees who are of unsound mind
or that there are other heirs or devisees but their names and addresses are unknown
to him, he shall so state . . ..
4. Section 473.033, RSMo 1973 Supp., provides in part:
The clerk, as soon as letters testamentary or of administration are issued, shall
cause to be published in some newspaper a notice of the appointment. . . . The
notice shall be published once a week for four consecutive weeks. The clerk shall
26
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The principal authority relied upon by the appellant was Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,' in which the United States
Supreme Court held that notice by publication of a binding judicial
settlement of common trust fund accounts violated due process as
to those persons known to the trustee to be beneficiaries of the trust.
The Court established a due process standard of notice, saying:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections.'
Appellant contended that this standard applies to probate proceed-
ings, and that the indifferent effort of the coexecutor to inform the
probate court of appellant's whereabouts did not meet this stan-
dard.
The majority opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court character-
ized appellant's contentions regarding notice as irrelevant, and did
not discuss two crucial issues: (1) whether section 473.017, RSMo
1969, requires personal representatives to exercise due diligence in
locating and notifying interested parties; and (2) if so, whether fail-
ure to comply with that standard of notice is a jurisdictional defect
robbing the probate decree of its validity, or, in the alternative,
whether it tolls the special statute of limitations governing will con-
tests. Instead, the court rested its affirmance on the ground that
section 473.083, RSMo 1969, confers jurisdiction upon the circuit
court to hear will contests only for a six month period following the
date of probate or of first publication of notice of the issuance of
letters testamentary, whichever is later. Since appellant's petition
was not filed within this six month period, the court held that his
action was barred.7
send a copy of the notice by ordinary mail to each heir and devisee whose name
and address are shown by the application for letters or other records of the court
5. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The trustee of a common trust fund petitioned a New York
surrogate court for a judicial settlement of its accounts. Such settlement was to be binding
and conclusive as to matters set forth therein and upon every person having any interest in
the common fund or in any participating trust. The trustee, complying with the minimum
statutory requirements, gave notice of the petition by publication in a local newspaper. The
notice contained only the company's name, address, the name and date of establishment of
the common fund, and a list of all participating estates, funds, or trusts.
6. Id. at 314 (1950) (emphasis added).
7. The court cited several cases in support of its decision, but although all of the cited
cases were decided on the ground that the statutory period within which to contest the will
19751
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In a concurring opinion, Judge Seiler took a broader view, say-
ing that if appellant's contention was correct, the probate court had
no jurisdiction to open the estate, and the statute of limitations
would never have begun to run against him. Judge Seiler then ad-
dressed the due process argument in a manner sympathetic to ap-
pellant, but voted to affirm the lower court's dismissal, preferring
to await legislative action or a definitive treatment of probate pro-
ceedings by the United States Supreme Court.'
The issue of the applicability of the Mullane standard of notice
to probate proceedings has occasioned much litigation and scholarly
commentary in recent years Advocates of applying the Mullane
standard of notice to probate proceedings stress the similarities be-
tween trust settlements, as in Mullane, and administration of dece-
dents' estates. Both situations have in rem and in personam charac-
teristics."0 Neither trust settlements nor probate in common form
have any supplemental notice. Possession of estate assets by the
decedent's personal representative may be adverse to persons inter-
ested in those assets, just as possession by the trustees in Mullane
could have been adverse to the interests of the trust beneficiaries.
Property was not taken directly from the Mullane trust beneficiar-
had expired, none dealt specifically with the issue of notice. In all of the cases the contestants
had actual knowledge of the proceedings and could have contested within the allowed period.
Black v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 321 S.W.2d 477 (Mo.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 920
(1959), involved a prisoner whose initial petition to contest a will was timely filed, but in the
wrong court. The court held that the status of a prisoner was not an exception listed in section
468.600, RSMo 1949 [now section 473.083, RSMo 1973 Supp.]. The issue of notice was
neither raised by the parties nor addressed by the court. State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo.
502, 178 S.W.2d 347 (En Banc 1944), dealt with a subsequent will found several years after
probate of the first will. The central issue was fraud, not lack of notice due to fraud. Miller
v. Munzer, 251 S.W.2d 966 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952), concerned an amendment to a petition
filed after the expiration of the statutory time limitation, but the initial petition was timely
filed.
8. 504 S.W.2d 44, 47-48 (Mo. 1973).
9. See generally Hayward, The Effect of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co. Upon Publication of Notice in Iowa, 36 IOWA L. REV. 47, 57 (1950); Carson, Probate
Proceedings-Administration of Decedents' Estates-The Mullane Case and Due Process of
Law, 50 MICH. L, REV. 124 (1952); Manlin and Martens, Informal Proceedings Under the
Uniform Probate Code: Notice and Due Process, 3 PROSPECTUS 39, 50-55 (1969); Fraser,
Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 316
(1951); Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1257, 1270
(1957); Note, Validity of Probate Notice Statutes in Ohio, 27 U. CN. L. REV. 76, 84 (1958).
10. See In re Shew's Estate, 48 Wash.2d 732, 734, 296 P.2d 667, 669 (1956). The Wash-
ington Supreme Court refused to apply the Mullane standard of notice to probate proceedings
because it characterized Mullane as an in personam case, whereas probate was in rem. The
decision is criticized in 32 WASH. L. REv. 165 (1957), and is highly suspect in view of the fact
that the Supreme Court in Mullane explicitly stated that its decision was not based on an in
rem-in personam distinction. 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
[Vol. 40
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ies, and property is not taken directly from those interested in es-
tates. These similarities between probate and trust proceedings,
plus the recent Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. Hanrahan,"
where the Mullane standard of notice was utilized and expanded,
indicate that the Supreme Court probably would have applied
Mullane to the circumstances presented in Haas. In addition, many
state courts have recognized that fourteenth amendment standards
of due process are at least relevant in determining proper notice of
probate proceedings. 12 Names and addresses of persons known to be
entitled to notice must be included in the petition for probate under
many state statutes." Four states have statutes explicitly requiring
the executor to make a diligent effort to ascertain interested persons
in order to make personal service upon them." A majority of states
require some form of notice, although not necessarily notice comply-
ing with the Mullane standard. 5
Opponents of extending the Mullane standard of notice to pro-
bate proceedings rely upon five traditional, non-policy arguments.'
First, there is some indication in the majority opinion in Mullane
that its holding is to be limited to the facts of the case.17 This
11. 409 U.S. 38 (1972). The Court held, through the application of the Mullane standard
of notice, that where the state of Illinois knew that the appellant was not at the address to
which notice was mailed, the automobile forfeiture proceeding was invalid. Notice mailed to
appellant's home address while he was being held in the Cook County jail was not, under
the circumstances, reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pending forfeiture.
12. See State v. Haddock, 140 So. 2d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (failure to comply
with the statutory requirement to give notice to known persons not cured by publication);
Vogel v. Katz, 64 Ill. App. 2d 126, 212 N.E.2d 295 (1965) (petitioner for probate of will
required to make reasonable inquiry to ascertain the information required by notice statute);
Estate of Barnes, 212 Kan. 502, 512 P.2d 387 (1973) (statute contemplates giving notice to
those known or capable of being known through the exercise of reasonable diligence); Daft v.
John & Elizabeth Whiteley Foundation, 363 Mich. 6, 108 N.W.2d 893 (1961) (reasonable
diligence exercised in locating heirs at law held a matter of satisfaction of the probate judge).
But see In re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d 894 (1953) (notice by publication only
held not to violate due process); Davidek v. Wyoming Inv. Co., 77 Wyo. 141, 308 P.2d 941
(1957) (publication held notice to the whole world).
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.28 (Supp. 1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 63 (Supp.
1974); MD. ANN. CODE ch. 11, § 7-104 (1974); § 473.017, RSMo 1969; N. D. CENT. CODE § 30-
05-07 (1960); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-63 (1959).
14. IDAHO CODE § 15-3-301 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2220 (Supp. 1973); MICH.
CoMP. LAws § 701.32 (Supp. 1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 879.01 (1971).
15. See cases cited note 12 supra; Note, Notice-Probate Procedure-1967 Draft of the
Uniform Probate Code, 53 IOWA L. Rav. 508 (1967).
16. See references note 9 supra.
17. The Court stated:
Personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as indispensable to the
process due to residents, and it has more often been held unnecessary as to nonresi-
dents. We disturb none of the established rules on these subjects.
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argument, somewhat forceful in 1950, has lost most of its impact.
Mullane has been cited by the Supreme Court as authority for hold-
ing invalid notice requirements in proceedings for bankruptcy,"8
condemnation,"9 and enforcement of tax liens.2 There has been no
indication from the Supreme Court that the Mullane rationale is to
be limited to trust situations.2"
The second argument against applying the Mullane standard
of notice to probate proceedings is that the Supreme Court is not
willing to override established rules and time-honored procedures
with fourteenth amendment due process requirements. 2  This con-
tention is highly suspect in view of the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions in Fuentes v. Shevin23 and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.24
Established practices are now being reexamined by the Court in
light of modern concepts of due process.
The third argument is based on the 70-year-old Supreme Court
decision in Farrell v. O'Brien.21 In Farrell, the Court held that pro-
bate in common form, followed by a one year period during which
the will might be contested, is a procedure adequate under the
fourteenth amendment. In probate in common form,26 no notice is
339 U.S. at 314.
The Supreme Court of Washington refused to apply the Mullane standard of notice to
probate proceedings saying Mullane applies only to a trust situation. New York Mdse. Co. v.
Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 828, 264 P.2d 863, 864 (1953).
18. City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
19. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112 (1956).
20. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
21. The Mullane standard of notice has been applied in numerous situations. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972) (automobile forfeiture proceeding); Groppi v.
Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502 (1971) (contempt resolution by legislature); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 541 (1971) (revocation of driving license); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 380
(1971) (divorce).
22. In Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922), the Court said:
If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need
a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it ....
Id. at 31.
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Court held Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes
invalid under the fourteenth amendment on the basis of deprivation of property without due
process of law notwithstanding the fact that the statutes are descendants of common law
replevin actions with a six century history. The Mullane standard of notice was cited with
approval.
24. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). A Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment of wages statute was
held to violate due process even though the Court had previously upheld the constitutionality
of similar garnishment procedures in Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), and McKay v.
McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
25. 199 U.S. 89 (1905).
26. In early English law there were two forms of probate. In common form probate the
30
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required primarily because it is believed that interested parties will
receive actual knowledge of the death anyway. Times and circum-
stances have changed since the 1905 approval of this no-notice pro-
cedure.Y The Court recently stated that "[tlhe fact that a proce-
dure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it
gives necessary protection to all property in its modern forms. '28
Another argument advanced for not applying the Mullane stan-
dard to probate proceedings is that persons interested in a dece-
dent's estate do not possess a property interest which is entitled to
due process protection. 29 The contention is that the right to succeed
to a decedent's property is not a constitutionally guaranteed right;
therefore, the state may adopt any statutory scheme upon which
receipt of estate property may be conditioned regardless of the type
of notice required. Recent Supreme Court decisions have estab-
lished that the requirements of due process do apply to the termina-
tion of statutory entitlements regardless of how the entitlement is
denominated. 0 Moreover, the Supreme Court has referred to
executor or other person desiring to establish the will produced it and proved its execution
by his own oath or such other witnesses as might be required, without giving notice to any
other person interested in establishing or defeating the instrument. Probate in solemn form
required that interested persons be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. In solemn
form probate there could be no reexamination except on appeal, but the common form might
be called into question at any time within thirty years and probate in solemn form was then
required. The Missouri Probate Code (ch. 473, RSMo 1969) has virtually duplicated the
English practice by providing for what is essentially common form probate with a possibility
of a will contest, equivalent to solemn form probate, in the circuit court thereafter. However,
one major difference remains. The English common form probate could be contested for thirty
years, whereas in Missouri the probate becomes binding after six months, if not contested
within that time. § 473.083, RSMo 1969. For a general discussion of probate in common form,
see 2 J . WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION § 215 (3d ed. 1923); Fratcher,
Missouri and the Uniform Probate Code, 26 J. Mo. B. 349 (1970); Levy, Probate in Common
Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice in Probate Proceedings, 1952 Wis. L. REv.
420.
27. No longer is tle family the close knit unit characteristic of medieval England or
rural America of the 19th century. Family members are now often dispersed throughout the
country and beyond. The sheer size of this country, combined with the present mobility of
its people, negate the assumption that news of a testator's death will be made known to all
interested persons.
28. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). The Missouri Supreme
Court has also looked with disfavor upon ex parte proceedings affecting property rights. See,
e.g., B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Alexander, 494 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. En Banc 1973) (where mortga-
gee had obtained prejudgment possession in replevin, notice of its intent to exercise claimed
resale rights prior to judgment must be given the mortgagor fifteen days prior to the sale);
State ex rel. Williams v. Berrey, 492 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. En Banc 1973) (deprivation of property
without prior notice, prior opportunity to be heard, or establishment of validity of underlying
claim held a violation of due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
29. See In re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 27, 60 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1953).
30. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (statutory right to driver's license); Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare rights).
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"legally protected interests," instead of "property interests," when
describing interests protected by due process."
Finally, opponents of applying the Mullane standard of notice
to probate proceedings also point to the fact that Mullane dealt with
a final order and contend that its principles should not be invoked
in cases dealing with future or conjectural interests. The probate
order is depicted as not being final, because there remains a period
in which to contest the proceedings.32 However, the Haas case
clearly exhibits that an opportunity to contest is of value if, and only
if, the contestant knows of the initial proceeding, and such knowl-
edge is received before the statute of limitations runs. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the right to be heard has little value
unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose
for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest. 3 In
Schroeder v. City of New York,31 the Supreme Court disregarded the
existence of a three year statute of limitations for filing claims
against the city and held that published and posted notice of a
condemnation proceeding was inadequate.
In addition to the above arguments, several policy arguments
have been advanced against applying the Mullane standard of no-
tice to probate proceedings. Opponents of applying the Mullane
standard allege that such application would place an undue burden
on both personal representatives and probate courts. This conten-
tion ignores the fact that the Mullane standard is essentially one of
reasonableness in the circumstances. The Mullane decision does not
require personal notice in all circumstances and acknowledges that
notice by publication, however imperfect it may be, satisfies due
process requirements as to persons whose names or addresses cannot
with due diligence be ascertained.35 Persons known to the personal
31. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962).
32. See Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89 (1905); In re Pierce's Estate, 245 Iowa 22, 60
N.W.2d 894 (1953). The Iowa Supreme Court in Pierce viewed this as a vital distinction
between the Mullane situation and probate proceedings.
33. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); cf. Snia-
dach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
34. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
35. 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950). At face value, the notice requirements of the Missouri
Probate Code would seem to comply with standards set by the Mullane decision. Section
473.017, RSMo 1973 Supp., requires the administrator or executor to list the names and
residence addresses of the surviving spouse, heirs, devisees, and legatees. The clerk of the
probate court must then publish notice of the appointment of the executor or administrator
and "send a copy of the notice by ordinary mail to each heir and devisee whose name and
address are shown by the application for letters or other records of the court." § 473.033,
RSMo 1973 Supp. (emphasis added). Presumably, a judicially imposed duty of due diligence
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representative, or capable of discovery in the exercise of due dili-
gence, are entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise them
of the pendency of the proceedings, that is, personal notice. Notice
by ordinary mail fully complies with due process requirements."
Such a requirement is not unduly burdensome to personal repre-
sentatives.
With respect to the burden on probate courts, a due diligence
standard would require no more than an inquiry by the probate
judge into the efforts made by the personal representative to ascer-
tain the names and addresses of interested parties. If no effort, or
an insufficient effort, had been made, the court could require addi-
tional specified measures. If the court is satisfied with the represent-
ative's efforts, the proceeding could continue and notice by publica-
tion to undiscovered interested persons would satisfy due process
requirements.3"
An additional policy argument against applying the Mullane
standard of notice to probate proceedings is that this would open all
probate proceedings to collateral attack by undiscovered or omitted
interested parties, thereby frustrating the state's interest in quick
and conclusive settlement of decedents' estates. Concededly, the
state has a valid and substantial interest in closing estates. How-
ever, this interest is not significantly greater than its interest in
settling trust accounts, and the latter was held insufficient to justify
notice requiring less than due diligence in Mullane. Moreover, the
interests of a beneficiary of an estate closely parallel the interests
on the executor or administrator could have satisfied the Mullane requirements. Judge Seiler
in his concurring opinion chose to defer this decision to the legislature.
36. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950).
37. There may be a problem in determining what means and degree of proof will be
required of an administrator or executor to satisfy the due diligence requirement. The usual
family records and affidavits of relatives and close friends of the deceased would be available
to the representative as a source for identifying all interested persons, but a large degree of
discretion must be exercised by the probate judge in determining when the statutory duty
has been met in a particular case. A related problem involves the method for preserving
evidence of due diligence on the record in case of appeal or collateral attack in a will contest.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Daft v. John & Elizabeth Whiteley Foundation, 363
Mich. 6, 108 N.W.2d 893 (1961), held the representative must be able to meet a timely
challenge as to diligence exercised, but that absent a statutory requirement, he need not meet
it in advance by affidavits.
It is in the interest of the personal representative to preserve on the record as much proof
of due diligence as is possible, regardless of whether or not the Mullane standard of notice is
made a procedural requirement. The general rule acknowledged in most jurisdictions is that
a personal representative is subject to personal libility for negligence or fraud in failing to
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of a beneficiary of a trust, and are deserving of comparable due
process protection.
The most substantial problem in allowing collateral attacks on
probate decrees on the ground that either the notice defect was
jurisdictional or because the notice defect tolled the statute of limi-
tation is that this could injure creditors and purchasers at probate
sales, who acted in reliance on the validity of the probate decree.
This third party reliance problem was not present in Mullane, and
arguably tips the scales against applying the Mullane standard of
notice to probate proceedings. However, this problem is not insolu-
ble. All notice defects need not be jurisdictional, but, rather, may
be held to toll the special statute of limitations applicable to will
contests." An analogy may be drawn to Missouri's statutory scheme
for the administration of the estates of absent persons. 9 Section
473.710, RSMo 1969, provides for the revocation of letters of admin-
istration upon satisfactory proof that the absent person is alive, at
which time all powers of the administrator cease. All receipts and
disbursements of assets and other acts of the administrator remain
as valid as if the letters were unrevoked, but title to any property
received by the widow, next of kin, or heir is revoked, and the
property may be recovered from such parties. A similar provision
could be adopted for the ordinary probate scheme, allowing collat-
eral attack on a final decree of distribution upon a showing that the
personal representative negligently or intentionally failed to supply
the probate court with the names and addresses of interested parties
and that the omitted party could have successfully contested the
will presented for probate. All prior actions of the personal repre-
sentative pertaining to the collection of receipts and payment of
creditors, including the sale of assets to pay the debts of the dece-
dent, would remain valid and binding. Only the final distribution
to heirs, devisees, and legatees would be invalidated.'" These indi-
38. Original § 473.013 in the 1955 Probate Code was amended by the legislature in 1957
by inserting the words "notice by publication" in the last sentence to make clear that the
initial publication of notice of letters is the only jurisdictional notice required. Welch, Probate
Code Amended by Senate Bill No. 1, 13 J. Mo. B. 148 (1957). Clapper v. Chandler, 406
S.W.2d 114 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966), however, has cast considerable doubt on whether the law
in this area has actually been changed. The court in Clapper held that the probate court
acquired no more jurisdiction initially over an intestate's realty than it did under the prior
statutes and that compliance with the supplemental notice provisions of § 473.493, RSMo
1959, was still a condition precedent to the exercise of the probate court's jurisdiction to order
a sale of the intestate's realty. This decision is soundly criticized in Basye, Are Probate Courts
in Missouri Undergoing Retrogression?, 32 Mo. L. REV. 175 (1967).
39. §§ 473.697-.720, RSMo 1969.
40. Such a statute would be an incentive for heirs, devisees, and legatees to notify the
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viduals, who received property without giving valuable considera-
tion, would be required to return to the estate the assets they re-
ceived or the proceeds from the sale of the assets, and the contesting
party would be allowed to prove the proper distribution.
The practical effect of the Haas decision is to allow a personal
representative, negligently or intentionally, to omit the name or
address of an interested party from his application for letters testa-
mentary, thus depriving the omitted party of any meaningful oppor-
tunity to contest the testamentary disposition. Such a result is not
dictated by overriding policy considerations. Moreover, Missouri
courts have traditionally put a premium on notice to interested
parties.4 Noncompliance with notice requirements " has been
deemed a jurisdictional defect43 rendering the probate court's order
void and tolling the special statute of limitations applicable to will
contests.44 In view of this tradition, the majority opinion in Haas
must be viewed as a significant retreat from earlier cases emphasiz-
ing the importance of notice to interested parties.
In light of the Haas court's failure to respond to the dictates of
Mullane, legislative action appears to be the only available remedy.
personal representatives of the existence and addresses of other interested parties.
41. In Clapper v. Chandler, 406 S.W.2d 114 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966), a probate court's
order for the sale of realty to pay claims was held invalid due to the lack of compliance by
the court with supplemental notice requirements to parties already within the proceeding.
The complaining heir was already a party to the proceeding, had actual knowledge of the sale,
and actively participated in the sale itself; but strict adherence to formalities was still re-
quired. Query why the courts in Missouri should be more concerned with supplemental notice
to a party who already knows of the proceeding and is actively participating, as in Clapper,
than with giving initial notice to an interested person who does not know of the proceeding
but will be bound by its decree, as in Haas?
42. Query whether the executor in Haas failed to comply with the statutory notice
requirements, since in his petition for letters he listed appellant's "address unknown. Last
known confined to Federal prison[?]" 504 S.W.2d at 45. An Illinois appellate court in Vogel
v. Katz, 64 Ill. App. 2d 126, 212 N.E.2d 295 (1965), held that listing an address as "New York
City," without making the effort of looking in a phone book for a more precise address, did
not meet statutory requirements of listing "known" interested parties. The Missouri Supreme
Court did not reach this issue in Haas.
43. In re Jackson's Will, 291 S.W.2d 214, 225 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956) (reasonable notice
to persons whose interests were involved in a contemplated order required as a prerequisite
to lawful exercise of court's power); accord, Wolff v. Rager, 326 Mo. 222, 30 S.W.2d 1005
(1930); Clapper v. Chandler, 406 S.W.2d 114 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966).
44. Munday v. Leeper, 120 Mo. 417, 25 S.W. 381 (1894); Clark v. Collins, 31 Mo. 260
(1860); Bryan v. Mundy, 17 Mo. 556 (1853); Hawkins v. Ridenhour, 13 Mo. 125 (1850);
Wiggins v. Lovering, 9 Mo. 157 (1845). These cases dealt with situations where the executor
failed to comply with the statutory requirement of notice by publication. In Haas the court
did not meet the issue of whether the executor satisfied the required statutory notice, much
less the issue of whether the statutory notice provisions themselves meet the demands of due
process.
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The problem of notice to heirs of the admission of a will to probate
is not the only due process problem under the Missouri Probate
Code." The Code makes no provision for notice to devisees under a
will which is known to exist but which has, in effect, been denied
probate by the admission of a different will to probate or the issu-
ance of letters of administration on a theory of intestacy. The ration-
ale of Mullane should also extend to such devisees.
Compliance with due process could be achieved without mas-
sive revision of the Missouri Probate Code. Section 473.017, RSMo
1969, should be amended to require every application for letters
testamentary or of administration to state that the applicant has
made a diligent search for all wills, all heirs of the decedent, the
addresses of all heirs discovered in such search, and to list the
names and addresses of beneficiaries named in known wills not
offered for probate. Because section 473.013, RSMo 1969, already
provides that only the original notice by publication is jurisdic-
tional, the probate court would have jurisdiction to proceed once it
is satisfied with the sufficiency of notice. In order to insure the
marketability of titles derived from a decedent, the enactment of a
recording statute requiring the probate judge to file an affidavit of
his finding of due diligence might be considered. Adoption of the
previously suggested provision limiting collateral attacks to the de-
cree of final distribution and allowing only the recovery of proceeds
if the previously distributed assets have been sold to bona fide pur-
chasers for value would adequately protect creditors and purchasers
at probate sales. Section 473.617, RSMo 1969, should be amended
to make the final decree of distribution subject to attack on proof
of the proper scheme of distribution and that the probate procedure
was invalid because an interested person was denied constitution-
ally sufficient notice. Finally, section 473.083, RSMo 1969, should
be amended to furnish remedies for an heir or devisee who failed to
commence timely proceedings for the probate or contest of a will
because he was denied constitutionally sufficient notice, provided
he can establish that such proceedings would have been successful.
A provision tolling the special six month statute of limitations
should be added to allow omitted parties a reasonable time after
learning of the probate proceedings to challenge the distribution.
These remedies could also include liability in damages of an appli-
cant for letters who failed to make a diligent search for wills, heirs,
45. Chapter 473, RSMo 1969.
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or the addresses of heirs. They could include the imposition of a
constructive trust upon the property of the estate received by the
distributee, or its proceeds, if: (1) the distributee accepted distribu-
tion under such circumstances that he should be charged with
knowledge that an heir was not given notice by mail because of
failure of the distributee to reveal to the applicant for letters the
existence of a will or the existence, interest, or address of the heir;
(2) the applicant failed to make the diligent search required of him;
or (3) anyone deliberately suppressed a will or concealed the exist-
ence or address of the heir.
This remedial legislation would afford greater protection to
beneficiaries of decedents' estates and also insulate Missouri pro-
bate practice from constitutional infirmity in the event that the
United States Supreme Court applies the Mullane standard of no-
tice to probate proceedings.
GARY R. CUNNINGHAM
37
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
TAXATION-SECTION 337 TREATMENT OF
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION BY FIRE-SALE OR
EXCHANGE OCCURS ON DATE OF CASUALTY
Central Tablet Manufacturing Co. v. United States'
On September 10, 1965, during a strike which had reduced
production to about five percent of normal volume, an accidental
fire destroyed a substantial portion of the plant and manufacturing
equipment of Central Tablet Manufacturing Company. Central
Tablet was an Ohio corporation engaged in the manufacture and
sale of writing tablets, school supplies, and related items. The
equipment and facilities were never repaired and Central Tablet
never again opened for business.
The corporation carried fire and extended coverage insurance
on the building, machinery, and inventory, as well as business inter-
ruption insurance. Negotiations began with the insurance company
one month later, after the "not unusual" rejection of the initial
proofs of claim was made by the insurance company. Although the
insurance company's liability was never seriously disputed, there
existed several areas of disagreement.' At a special shareholders'
meeting eight months after the date of the fire, the decision to
dissolve the corporation was made and a plan of dissolution and
complete liquidation was adopted. One month later, payment was
received on the building claim. The taypayer's personal property
claim was settled in August, and payment on that claim was re-
ceived in November, 11 and 13 months after the fire, respectively.
The corporate assets remaining after distribution to the sharehold-
ers was placed in trust for the shareholders on May 3, 1967, and on
the same day the corporation filed a certificate of dissolution with
the Ohio Secretary of State. These last steps were accomplished
within 12 months of the adoption of the plan of complete liquida-
tion, although it was 21 months after the date of the casualty. The
remaining insurance claim for business interruption was settled in
August, 1967, and payment was received in September of that year.
Therefore, the final insurance payment was not received until al-
most two years after the casualty had occurred.3
The taxpayer realized a gain from the fire insurance proceeds
which it treated as non-taxable, relying upon section 337 of the 1954
1. - U.S. - 94 S. Ct. 2516 (1974).
2. 94 S. Ct, at 2518.
3. 94 S. Ct. at 2519.
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Internal Revenue Code.4 The Internal Revenue Service asserted a
deficiency for the capital gain equal to the excess of the fire insur-
ance proceeds over adjusted basis. The taxpayer paid the deficiency
and brought an action to recover the amount paid.
The district court5 relied heavily on the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Morton.' In
adhering to the holding in Morton, the court found that the purpose
of section 337 was to avoid double taxation and that the section
included within its coverage plans of complete liquidation adopted
after involuntary conversion. The district court rejected the govern-
ment's attempt to distinguish the cash basis taxpayer in Morton
from the accrual basis taxpayer in Central Tablet. The court found
that even under the accrual basis system of accounting, income is
not received, and therefore not taxable, until the amount is suscep-
tible of calculation. The court held that the income to the taxpayer
in Central Tablet was not determinable until some time after the
fire, and consequently no gain resulted until after the plan had been
adopted.
7
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed. 8 The court expressly declined to follow the decision
in Morton, finding instead that section 337 was intended to apply
only when the corporation was firmly committed to liquidation prior
to the casualty or sale. The court recognized that involuntary con-
versions are entitled to nonrecognition under section 337, but held
that the taxpayer's failure to adopt the plan of complete liquidation
prior to the casualty was fatal to its case since the date of the fire is
the date of the conversion for purposes of section 337. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict between the
Eighth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit.'
The Supreme Court found that the only point in issue was
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(a):
General rule-If-
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954,
and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan,
all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less
assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such
corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month
period.
5. 339 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
6. 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968).
7. 339 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
8. 481 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1973).
9. Cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973).
19751
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whether section 337 can be applied when the involuntary conversion
occurs prior to the date of the adoption of a plan of complete liqui-
dation. To determine this it was necessary to ascertain at what point
the "sale or exchange" takes place in the involuntary conversion
process for purposes of section 337. The Court found that the sale
or exchange took place at the time of the casualty and not at some
later time in the process. Since the plan did not precede the sale or
exchange, section 337 was unavailable to allow the corporation to
escape tax on the gain. 0
The enactment of section 337 was primarily a result of the tax
problems which arose when a corporation undertook to sell its assets
and liquidate. Under the general tax principles then governing, a
corporation selling low basis assets for cash realized a corporate gain
equal to the amount by which the selling price exceeded the corpo-
ration's basis in the assets. The corporation, after paying the tax on
this gain, would then distribute the remaining cash in liquidation
and each shareholder would receive cash in exchange for the surren-
der of his stock in the corporation. Each shareholder would therefore
realize a taxable gain to the extent that the cash received in liquida-
tion exceeded his basis in the stock. Thus, in the overall process, two
taxable gains resulted: first at the corporate level and then at the
shareholder level.
On the other hand, if the corporation first liquidated by trans-
ferring the assets to the shareholders in exchange for the cancella-
tion of all their stock, the shareholders would have a gain equal to
the amount by which the fair market value of the assets received
exceeded their basis in the stock. However, pursuant to section
334(a), the shareholders take a basis in the assets equal to fair
market value. If these assets are then immediately sold by the
shareholders to a buyer for an amount equal to fair market value,
no gain is realized since the basis in the assets equals the selling
price. Thus, when the sequence is a liquidation followed by a sale,
only one taxable gain occurs; but if the sequence is a sale followed
by liquidation, two taxable gains occur. It is hardly surprising to
find that, when such substantial tax consequences depended on
such inconsequential factual differences, inequities resulted. Two
leading Supreme Court cases signaled the problem.
In Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.," the Court held that
the tax consequences which arise from gains upon sale of property
10. 94 S. Ct. at 2524.
11. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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are not to be determined solely by the means used by the taxpayer
to transfer legal title."2 The taxpayer in that case was a closely held
corporation in which the sole asset was an apartment house. The
stock was held by two persons, husband and wife. Negotiations were
commenced between the corporation and a buyer for the sale of the
apartment house. The terms of the sale had been substantially
agreed upon when the parties met to reduce the agreement to writ-
ing. At this meeting the officers of the corporation were informed of
the tax consequences of the proposed sale and it was called off. The
next day a liquidating dividend was declared by the corporation,
and the assets were transferred to the husband and wife. They sub-
sequently completed the sale to the original buyer under substan-
tially the same terms, except that the names of the shareholders
were substituted for that of the corporation as seller. Justice Black,
writing for the majority, adopted the Tax Court's findings of facts
and agreed that the sale had been made by the corporation, rather
than the shareholders. Therefore, the corporation was first taxed on
the capital gain realized in the sale of the asset, and the sharehold-
ers were then taxed on the amount they had received in the surren-
der of their stock above its adjusted basis.
Five years later, in a case involving similar facts, the Court
reached the opposite result. Justice Black again wrote the opinion
of the majority in United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.13
Cumberland involved a closely held utility company whose share-
holders had voted to go out of business. The buyer refused the
corporation's original offer to sell all the company's stock. There-
after, the corporation refused the buyer's counteroffer to purchase
only the transmission lines of the company, and the negotiations
were called off. Hoping to save the corporation from a large capital
gains tax, the shareholders had the assets transferred to themselves
in partial liquidation, and they in turn sold the transmission lines
to the original buyer. The corporation then sold its remaining assets
and went out of business. A large gain was realized on the sale of
the transmission lines, and the Commissioner charged that gain to
the corporation. The Court relied on the finding of the Court of
Claims that the sale had been made by the shareholders in their
personal capacity after the liquidation, and therefore, held that the
corporation had realized no taxable gain from the sale. The transfer
of the assets to the shareholders resulted in a taxable gain to the
12. Id. at 334.
13. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
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shareholders equal to the excess of fair market value of the assets
over the basis of the stock in the hands of the shareholders. As a
result, the shareholders' basis in the assets transferred by the corpo-
ration was equal to the fair market value of those assets. The
amount realized on the subsequent sale of the transmission lines by
the shareholders at fair market value equaled the basis of those
assets in the hands of the shareholders and, therefore, no capital
gain was realized.
Although the practical difference seemed to be whether the tax
advice came early or late, the distinction between the Court Holding
Co. and the Cumberland decisions was a source of much confusion
to taxpayers." In order to simplify steps necessary to avoid the
double taxation of a liquidating corporation, Congress enacted sec-
tion 337 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Section 337 allows the
taxpayer nonrecognition of both capital gains and losses which
occur from the sale of the corporation's assets if the sale occurs on
or after the date of adoption of a plan of complete liquidation and
the assets are distributed in complete liquidation within the twelve
month period following the date of the adoption of the plan. The
section removes the formalistic necessity of transferring the assets
to the shareholders who then make the sale. Under section 337, a
corporation may simply adopt a plan of complete liquidation and
then sell its property. The subsequent transfer of the proceeds from
the sale in exchange for the shareholders' stock will be the only
transaction which produces recognized tax consequences. Although
the most publicized purpose of this section was to avoid the formal-
istic distinctions which had developed from the Court Holding Co.
- Cumberland decisions,'- it seems reasonable to assume that the
tacit implication of the enactment was that the double tax situa-
tions should be avoided by corporations selling assets in the course
of liquidation. The Senate and House versions of the original bill
differed in some respects, the most significant being a definition of
"plan" which appeared in the House version but not in the Sen-
ate's.16 However, both houses made it clear that determining tax
14. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 111.63, at 11-57 (3d ed. 1971).
15. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38(B)(3) (1954) states in part:
. . . In order to eliminate questions resulting only from formalities, your com-
mittee has provided that if a corporation in process of liquidation sells assets there
will be no tax at the corporate level ....
16. Compare S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49, 258-59 (1954), which had no
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consequences on the subtle distinctions outlined in Court Holding
Co. and Cumberland was undesirable. Section 337 was aimed at
remedying the uncertainty and complexity in the area of corporate
liquidation1 7 caused by taxpayers' attempts to avoid double taxa-
tion. 8
Even after the enactment of section 337 as part of the 1954
Code, the section's applicability to involuntary conversions was
unclear. In 1956, the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling that
fire insurance proceeds did not constitute a "sale or exchange" for
purposes of section 337 nonrecognition."5 The ruling relied on the
Supreme Court decision in Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak
Leather Co. , which held that nothing in the language of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1939 expressed an intention by Congress to
classify the proceeds from fire insurance for loss of property as a sale
or exchange of a capital asset. The lower courts refused to follow the
ruling,2 and in 1964, the original ruling was rescinded and a new
ruling announced which recognized involuntary conversion by rea-
son of fire as a sale or exchange for purposes of section 337.21
When the involuntary conversion was brought about by con-
demnation, the Service was somewhat more consistent. It had less
Subsection (c) defines the plan which is required in a partial or complete liquida-
tion. Present law does not define a plan of liquidation either in connection with
section 112(b)(6) or (7) or 115(c). Under subsection (c), a distribution shall be
considered made pursuant to a plan, if it is made subsequent to and in accordance
with a resolution by the shareholders or the board of directors providing for the
termination of the business (or one of the businesses in a partial liquidation) and
the transfer of a part or all of the assets in redemption of the stock. Subsection (c)
further provides that any anticipatory specification of the time required to complete
the distribution in partial or complete liquidation is irrelevant.
17. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. A106 (1954).
18. See Rev. Rul. 387, 1956-2 CUM. BuLL. 189 (involving an involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding in which the receiver applied for treatment under section 337):
Congress intended through section 337 of the 1954 Code to eliminate the double tax
on gains realized from sales of corporate assets during a period of liquidation, but
did not intend to eliminate entirely the tax on such gains. Where the shareholders
are to receive nothing in the liquidation in payment for their stock, there is no
possibility of a tax to both the corporation and the shareholders on the gains
resulting from the sale.
19. Rev. Rul. 372, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 187.
20. 313 U.S. 247 (1941). The result in this case was reversed by the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 151(b), 56 Stat. 846 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231).
21. See Kent Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1961); Towanda
Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960). These cases relied on the
statutory change after Flaccus. See note 20 supra.




et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
difficulty finding a sale or exchange present in a condemnation
proceeding, which involves an actual passing of title. In condemna-
tion cases, the courts and the Commissioner have been in agreement
that, for purposes of section 337, the sale or exchange occurs when
title passes as determined by the applicable local law.2 Therefore,
if a plan of liquidation is adopted prior to title passing, the benefits
of section 337 are available to the condemnee. This policy necessar-
ily results in divergent treatment of condemnation proceeds under
section 337 in different jurisdictions. The taxpayer has more time
to adopt a plan in states such as Missouri, where title passes only
after the award is made and payment is received in the registry of
the court or by the condemnee .2 A taxpayer may be penalized in
states where title passes upon the mere filing by the condemnor of
a declaration of taking.25 Therefore, the process of corporate liquida-
tion in cases of involuntary conversion by condemnation is depen-
dent upon the local law, specifically upon what point title to the
property in question passes to the condemnor. But as the courts
have recognized, it is impossible to draw a perfect analogy between
the condemnation cases and those involving involuntary conversion
by fire, since in the latter instances, title to the property is never
relinquished. It thus becomes more difficult to determine at what
point the sale or exchange takes place.26
Mere difficulty or imprecision in determining the date of a
necessary occurrence, however, has not always deterred the courts
or the Internal Revenue Service from allowing a taxpayer the benefit
of protective provisions of the Code. The courts have on occasion
liberally construed some parts of section 337 in order to reach "just"
results. In finding the date of adoption of a plan of liquidation,
broad construction is evident. The Treasury Regulations accompa-
nying section 337 have allowed plans adopted on the same day as
the sale to be considered as within the scope of the statute.Y Fur-
23. See Likins-Foster Honolulu Corp. v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 987 (1970); Covered Wagon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 369 F.2d 629 (8th
Cir. 1966); Dwight v. United States, 328 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1964); Driscoll Bros. v. United
States, 221 F. Supp. 603 (2d Cir. 1963); Rev. Rul. 108, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 72.
24. See Feinberg v. Commissioner, 377 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1967); Pettit v. County
Comm'r, 123 Md. 128, 90 A. 993 (1914); St. Louis Housing Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144
(Mo. 1964); Heidisch v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 602, 84 A.2d 566 (1951). See
generally 26 AM. Jun. 2d Eminent Domain § 131 (1966).
25. See Wendall v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1964); Place Realty Corp., 21
T.C.M. 754 (1962). See also Federal Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 258(a) et. seq.
(1970).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 1968).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-1 (1954), as amended T.D. 6806, 30 Fed. Reg. 2850 (1965).
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thermore, the position taken in the regulations is that the date of
adoption of the plan of liquidation is to be ascertained by a determi-
nation of all the facts and circumstances, and gathered from the
intent of the parties." The Regulations distinguish between execu-
tory contracts and executed contracts of sale. "Ordinarily, a sale has
not occurred when a contract to sell has been entered into but title
and possession of the property have not been transferred and the
obligation of the seller to sell or the buyer to buy is conditional."2
This flexible policy has allowed some courts to find the adoption of
a plan of liquidation without formal proof of shareholder approval.3 1
Although it has led to a few arguably inconsistent results, 31 this
approach does appear reasonable. For purposes of section 337, the
important aspect to be considered should be the intent to liquidate
at the time of the sale, coupled with an actual cessation of opera-
tions and a liquidating distribution.2
The Supreme Court, however, did not choose to support the
policy of liberal determination of dates when the conversion is a
result of actual destruction of the property. It instead placed some
emphasis in Central Tablet on the fact that taxpayers who incur a
gain as a result of a casualty can seek relief under section 1033(a) (3)
of the 1954 Code which allows nonrecognition of gains from casualty
insurance proceeds when used to acquire replacement property sim-
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (1954). "The date on which a sale occurs depends primarily
upon the intent of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract and the surround-
ing circumstances . . . ." Id. In theory, of course, this stance can work both in favor of and
against taxpayers. See cases cited note 31 infra.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (1954).
30. See, e.g., Benoit v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 485, 492 (1st Cir. 1956); Richard H.
Survaunt, 5 T.C. 665, 672, aff'd, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947); Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371,
382 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945); Holmby Corp.,
28 B.T.A. 1092 (1933), afl'd, 83 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1936). See Pustilnik, Liquidation of Closely-
Held Corporations Under Section 337, 16 TAx L. Rav. 255, 260 (1961), noting two lines of
authority to support the proposition: (1) liquidation is a question of fact, regardless of whether
a formal plan of dissolution has been adopted; and (2) reorganization has occurred even in
absence of a formal shareholder resolution. See also Bennion, Sale of Corporate Assets Under
Section 337, 1958 So. CALIF. TAX INST. 253, 259.
31. Compare City Bank, 38 T.C. 713 (1962) (shareholder approval); and Virginia Ice &
Freezing Corp., 30 T.C. 1251 (1958) (shareholder approval); with Alameda Realty, 42 T.C.
273 (1964); Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 64-1 U.S.T.C. 9157 (N.D. Tex. 1963);
Henry H. Adams, 38 T.C. 549 (1962); and Mountain Water Co., 35 T.C. 418 (1960).
32. See Mountain Water Co., 35 T.C. 418 (1960), in which the court said:
If all the facts and circumstances indicate that the assets were in fact sold as a part
of a plan to liquidate the company and the corporation in fact goes out of business
and distributes its assets in complete liquidation within the 12-month period, it
would seem the purpose has been accomplished ....
Id. at 426.
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ilar or related in use. 33 Once the property has been replaced under
section 1033, if liquidation is desired the taxpayer can always adopt
a plan and proceed under section 337, and thereby avoid a double
tax on the gain from the transaction. Unfortunately, this procedure
is not always available or desirable considering the restrictions in-
herent in section 1033.11 Many times reinvestment is simply not
feasible, particularly where a substantial portion of the assets of the
corporation was destroyed in the fire. In a period of inflation the
insurance proceeds may not even begin to cover the skyrocketing
costs of rebuilding on the same scale as the old operation. Even if
replacement were feasible, this long-hand method of reaching the
result of a true section 337 liquidation seems unnecessary.35
The thrust of the opposition to the decision reached in Central
Tablet is that one who chooses to liquidate should not be favored
over one who is forced into liquidation by involuntary conversion.
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service have been lenient
toward corporations which have attempted to utilize section 337 in
the course of voluntary liquidation, even finding the adoption of a
plan of liquidation where none was formally adopted. Corporations
pursuing voluntary liquidations have a better opportunity to ascer-
tain the nature of gains or losses from the sale or exchange of their
assets before they are locked into section 337 nonrecognition .3 The
extent of the flexibility under section 337 afforded corporations
which choose to liquidate is evident from the result reached in many
of the so-called "straddle cases." The procedure in such cases in-
volves a sale by a corporation of assets which it expects will produce
a loss, followed by adoption of a plan of complete liquidation and a
sale of the remaining assets which it expects to result in a capital
gain. By a literal interpretation of section 337, the loss realized
before the adoption of the plan of liquidation is recognized while the
capital gain realized after the plan was adopted will not be recog-
nized. The loss from the pre-liquidation sales can then be applied
to offset the taxable capital gains incurred while the corporation was
in business. The Internal Revenue Service will typically accept the
33. 94 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
34. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1033 (requirement that replacement property be
similar or related in use).
35. See United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1968); Towanda Textiles,
Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373, 376 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Kovey, When will Section 337
Shield Fire Loss Proceeds? A Current Look at a Burning Issue, 39 J. TAX. 258, 260 (1973).
36. See cases cited note 31 supra; Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670, 674
(1st Cir. 1956).
37. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (1954).
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taxpayer's reported dates for the respective sales and adoption of
the plan of liquidation if the taxpayer is prepared to either sell
substantially all of its assets before the plan so that losses, will offset
gains outside of section 337, or sell substantially all of its assets after
the plan." Otherwise, the Service will require proof that the earlier
sale was not in contemplation of liquidation and not connected with
the later sale of gain-producing assets.39 Attempts by the Service to
pierce through the straddle device by arguing that an "informal
plan" of liquidation was adopted before the initial loss sale, have
been largely unsuccessful in the courts, in situations where the tax-
payers followed the necessary formalities. The courts have paid par-
ticular attention to the formal adoption of a plan by shareholder
resolution." Careful advance planning has been the key to taxpayer
success in most of those cases.
The Internal Revenue Service4' and some courts4 2 have found
that Congress intended that there should be only one tax upon the
liquidation and sale of assets of a corporation. If that were the intent
embodied in section 337, the important factor in applying it to an
involuntary conversion should be whether the assets involuntarily
converted actually cause the complete liquidation of the corpora-
tion. Broad interpretation of the statute in dealing with involuntary
conversions would reach the most equitable result.43 However, the
court in Central Tablet refused to acknowledge a congressional in-
tent to prevent double taxation when the sale is caused by involun-
tary conversion, even though the corporation subsequently liqui-
dates. Consequently, taxpayer corporations are forced to deal with
the strict, literal reading given section 337 by the court in Central
Tablet and accept the date of the casualty as the date of the sale or
exchange. As Justice White pointed out in his dissent, those corp-
orations which are closely held may be able to move quickly enough
38. B. BirrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 14, at 11.64.
39. See Rev. Rul. 140, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL. 118.
40. See Jason L. Honigman, 55 T.C. 1067 (1971); City Bank, 38 T.C. 713 (1962); Moun-
tain Water Co., 35 T.C. 418 (1960); Virginia Ice & Freezing Corp., 30 T.C. 1251 (1958). But
see Henry H. Adams, 38 T.C. 549 (1962) (loss sale; date of deed controls, held within section
337 when dated same day as adoption of plan).
41. See Rev. Rul. 387, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 189, which was a ruling on a bankruptcy
application under section 337. The Internal Revenue Service stated: "Congress intended
through section 337 of the 1954 Code to eliminate the double tax on gains realized from sales
of corporate assets during periods of liquidation . .. ."
42. See, e.g., Mountain Water Co., 35 T.C. 418, 426 (1960).
43. See United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968); Towanda Textiles, Inc.
v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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to adopt a plan to complete liquidation on the same day as the fire."
The problem with this approach is that section 337 applies with
equal vigor to gains and losses which accrue and, conceivably, quick
adoption of the plan could result in undesired nonrecognition of a
loss to the taxpayer, with no opportunity to use the "straddle"
scheme and save section 337 treatment for the gains.
There is some authority to support the proposition that a con-
tingent plan of liquidation, approved in advance by the sharehold-
ers, would be accepted by the courts. 5 A plan which becomes effec-
tive only upon the destruction or condemnation of substantially all
the assets of the corporation is a possible hedge against being forced
into liquidation at a disadvantage. If such a contingent plan is put
into effect, the corporation must then complete the distribution of
assets within the twelve-month period from the date of adoption of
the plan.46 It must not forget that section 337 treats both gains and
losses accruing on or after adoption of the plan as nonrecognizable.
However, the corporation with a contingent liquidation plan can
avoid the nonrecognition of a loss if it is also willing to forego nonre-
cognition of gains by prolonging the distribution of the assets to
shareholders beyond the statutory twelve-month period. This re-
moves the corporation from the treatment of section 337. If the
corporation decides not to liquidate after the casualty, the contin-
gent plan could simply be rescinded by corporate action.
The denial of section 337 to taxpayers who are forced by invol-
untary conversion to liquidate may create more problems for tax-
payers. Certainly, the date on which a sale or exchange occurs in an
involuntary conversion by fire is resolved by the decision in Central
Tablet. The flexibility shown by the courts in finding the date of
adoption of the liquidation plan suggests a possible avenue of litiga-
tion for those taxpayers intending to liquidate who discover too late
that a casualty loss can create unforeseen and undesirable tax con-
sequences. However, in the last analysis the remedy rests with Con-
gress. Specific legislation is needed to equalize the tax consequences
44. Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 2516, 2531-32 (1974) (dissenting
opinion).
45. See Henry H. Adams, 38 T.C. 549 (1962) (sale contract tied to date of plan of
liquidation); cf. Mountain Water Co., 35 T.C. 418 (1960) (plan held adopted from intent of
directors). But see Whitson v. Rockwood, 190 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.D. 1961) (danger in making
liquidation plan contingent upon prior sale of assets).
46. In this respect, it should be noted that Central Tablet would not have benefited
even if it had previously drawn such a contingent plan, since the distribution was not com-
pleted within 12 months of the fire.
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of involuntary and voluntary liquidation.47 Until Congress acts it is
obvious that section 337 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code remains
an area where careful advance corporate planning is essential."
KIM R. MOORE
47. See Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Advisory Group
Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 532 (1959). It is important to note that in spite of the recognition by the committee
of the need for explicit changes in § 337 to include provisions for involuntary conversion, no
congressional action has been taken.
48. See B. BITrKER & J. EusTca, supra note 14, at 11.64, discussing the need of a
"plan" and potential abuses of the statute. "One can only speculate about the number of
fraudulently predated documents that are employed in this area, where the stakes are high
and the taxpayer is likely to feel that his failure to adopt a plan in advance was an inconse-
quential detail." Id. at 11.62.
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